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Abstract
This paper tackles the monetary policy performance in Brazil, Chile and South Africa
under inflation targeting framework. Furthermore, it provides an empirical assessment through
using the unrestricted Vector Auto-regression (VAR) and Structural Vector Auto-regression
(SVAR) approaches depending on data spans the period from the first quarter of 1970 to the
fourth quarter of 2007. On the other hand, it utilizes the Likelihood Ratio (LR) Statistic to test
for possible structural changes due to the adoption of inflation targeting regime in those
countries.
The main findings are as follows: inflation targeting does make a difference in the
performance of monetary policy in those countries. Furthermore, the experience of Brazil, Chile
and South Africa provides important lessons for other emerging market economies to adopt
such a framework.
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1. Introduction:-
There is no doubt that many countries have adopted comprehensive reforms towards the
independence of their central banks. One of the remarkable changes in conducting monetary
policy is the widespread adoption of inflation targeting by many industrialized countries as well
as emerging market economies since 1990s. This option has followed the unsuccessful adoption
of monetary targeting regimes or using exchange rates as nominal anchors.
According to Mishkin (2000), inflation targeting has several advantages as a medium-term
strategy for the implementation of monetary policy. In contrast to an exchange-rate peg,
inflation targeting enables monetary policy to focus on domestic considerations and to respond
to shocks to the domestic economy. Furthermore, in contrast to monetary targeting, inflation
targeting has the advantage that a stable relationship between money and inflation is not critical
to its success, but instead it uses all available information to determine the best settings for the
instruments of monetary policy. Inflation targeting also has the key advantage that it is highly
transparent.
This paper assesses the monetary policy performance in Brazil, Chile and South Africa. It
illustrates the main reasons behind the adoption of inflation targeting framework. Furthermore,
it provides empirical investigation through using the unrestricted Vector Auto-regression
(VAR) and Structural Vector Auto-regression (SVAR) approaches to investigate the responses
of inflation rates and output gap to monetary policy shocks as well as a simple Likelihood Ratio
(LR) Statistic to test for structural changes due to the adoption of inflation targeting regime.
The data spans the period from the first quarter of 1970 to the fourth quarter of 2007.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2, illustrates the conceptual framework of
inflation targeting regime. Section 3, provides an overview of the relevant literature. Section 4,
represents an overview of the monetary policy framework in Brazil, Chile and South Africa and
the reasons behind the adoption of inflation targeting. Section 5, shows the estimation
approaches and the main results. Finally, I conclude.
2. Conceptual Framework:-
Inflation targeting is a monetary-policy strategy that encompasses five main elements;
(1) the public announcement of medium-term numerical targets for inflation; (2) an institutional
commitment to price stability as the primary goal of monetary policy, to which other goals are
subordinated; (3) an information-inclusive strategy in which many variables, and not just
monetary aggregates or the exchange rate, are used for deciding the setting of policy
instruments; (4) a transparent monetary policy strategy 2 that ascribes a central role to
communicating to the public and the markets (the plans, objectives, and rationale for the
decisions of the central bank); and (5) mechanisms that make the central bank accountable for
attaining its inflation objectives.
Inflation targeting is usually formalized in agreements between the central bank and
government, a regulation, or a statement announcing the targets. Central banks generally have
instrument autonomy. Government is responsible for setting the target either independently or
jointly with the central bank. This is particularly the case for developed economies. In those
countries, government may also have an override provision for a certain period, in case of
policy differences, that is subject to public disclosure and appeals process.
The following subsections indicates the main classification of inflation targeting regimes, the
prerequisites that have to be fulfilled by the country and how to model the inflation targeting
strategy.
2.1 Classification of Inflation Targeting Regimes:
Carare and Stone (2006) have provided a classification of inflation targeting countries
into three regimes. The regimes are defined by the clarity and credibility of the central bank’s
commitment to the inflation target. Clarity is gauged by the public announcement of the
inflation target and by the institutional arrangements in support of accountability to the target.
Credibility is proxied by the actual inflation outturn and by market ratings of long-term local
currency government debt.
· Full-Fledged Inflation Targeting (FFIT):-
It is the best-known form of inflation targeting. In this regime, countries have a medium to
high level of credibility, clearly commit to their inflation target, and institutionalize this
2 In practice, openness and transparency in the conduct of monetary policy in an inflation targeting framework have
been promoted by the regular publication of an Inflation Report, which sets out the central bank’s analysis of recent
economic developments, and a forecast of inflation as well as other variables including output over the coming year
or years. Refer to Agénor (2000).
commitment in the form of a transparent monetary framework that fosters accountability of the
central bank to the target. New Zealand was the first country to adopt (FFIT), and by 2001
some seven industrial 3 and eleven emerging market 4 countries were practicing this regime.
· Implicit Price Stability Anchor (IPSA) 5:-
In this regime, countries have so much credibility that they can maintain low and stable
inflation without full transparency and accountability with respect to an inflation target. Their
record of low and stable inflation and high degree of financial stability affords them the
flexibility to pursue the objective of output stabilization, as well as price stability. Five
developed countries that their central banks are classified as practicing (IPSA), including the
European Central Bank and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 6
· Inflation Targeting Lite (ITL):-
Countries announce a broad inflation objective but owing to relatively low credibility are
not able to maintain inflation as the foremost policy objective. Their relatively low credibility
reflects their vulnerability to large economic shocks and financial instability and a weak
institutional framework. The number of (ITL) countries is nineteen and all are emerging market
countries. 7
2.2 Prerequisites of the Adoption of Inflation Targeting Regime:-
As Amato and Gerlach (2002) have mentioned, one essential precondition is the
independence of the central bank. There is broad agreement that instrument independence 8 is
desirable for good monetary policy, whatever the exact policy framework. Goal independence,
however, appears to be less important.
3 Those countries are New Zealand, Canada, United Kingdom, Sweden, Australia, Iceland and Norway.
4 Chile, Brazil, Czech republic, Israel, Poland ,Columbia, Hungary, Mexico, Korea, South Africa and
Thailand.
5 Carare and Stone have referred to the second classification of inflation targeting as Eclectic Inflation Targeting
(EIT) -in an old version of their paper- See, Carare and Stone (2003) .Whereas, the two authors refereed to it as
Implicit price stability anchor (IPSA) in a recent version of their paper dated 2006. Both (EIT) and (IPSA) refer to
the same characteristics. However, the former is widely used in the monetary policy literature.
6 It also includes the central banks of Singapore, Switzerland, and Japan.
7 Croatia, Peru, Philippines, Uruguay, Slovenia, Algeria, Guatemala, Jamaica, Slovak Republic, Dominican
Republic, Albania, Kazakhstan, Mauritius, Indonesia, Honduras, Russia, Romania, Sri Lanka and Venezuela.
8 There are three notions of independence as illustrated by Bofinger (2001):-
i Goal independence: requires that the government has no direct influence on the goals of the monetary policy.
i Instrument independence: requires that the central bank be able to set its operating targets (interest rate,
exchange rate) autonomously.
i Personal independence: requires that the decision-making body of a central bank be in a position to resist
formal directives as well as informal pressure from the government.
Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) have showed that the adoption of inflation targeting is often
linked with changes in the laws or administrative arrangements associated with the central
bank. Typically, reforms are in the direction of increased independence for the central bank,
particularly in respect to its choice of instrument settings. This seems to be a logical
consequence of making price stability the overriding goal of policy, since the central bank is the
best place to make the technical decisions necessary to achieve price stability and to make
judgments about whether the pursuit of other objectives is consistent with this goal.
Another precondition is the absence of any firm commitment by the authorities to target the
level or path of any other nominal variable, such as wages or, especially, the nominal exchange
rate. In fact, a country that chooses a fixed exchange rate system subordinates its monetary
policy to the exchange rate objective and is unable to target any other nominal variable on a
lasting basis, especially in the presence of capital mobility.9
In practice, however, in many of the developing countries those have opted for a de jure
flexible exchange rate, monetary authorities have continued to pay considerable attention to the
value of the domestic currency often adopting a de facto target path or band. There are various
reasons for the central bank to be concerned with nominal exchange rate movements, even
when its degree of independence (and thus its ability to commit itself only to the pursuit of
price stability) is high. First, the exchange rate has a direct impact on inflation and plays a key
role in transmitting monetary policy shocks to prices. If the pass-through effect is indeed high,
the central bank may be tempted to intervene on the foreign exchange market to limit currency
fluctuations. A high degree of nominal exchange rate instability may also be of concern to
policymakers to the extent that it translates into a high degree of variability in the real exchange
rate and distorted relative price signals to domestic producers. Another important reason is that
in (partially) dollarized economies large fluctuations in exchange rates can lead to banking and
financial instability by inducing large portfolio shifts between domestic and foreign currency
denominated assets. Finally, in countries where the corporate and banking sectors hold large
foreign-currency liabilities, exchange rate depreciations can have significant adverse effects on
their balance sheets. This was, indeed, one of the important features of the Asian crisis. 10
Sound fiscal policy is also considered as an important precondition. It is easy to see that good
government finances are highly desirable. Most obviously, they reduce the risk of the central
bank ending up as a residual purchaser of government bonds. Another precondition is that the
9 Refer to Masson et al. (1997).
10 Refer to Agénor (2000).
economy needs to be resilient to changes in exchange rates and interest rates. Since monetary
policy under inflation targeting is no longer geared to maintaining a stable external value of the
currency, large exchange rate changes can result. Finally, it is frequently argued that, because
inflation targeting is a forward-looking monetary policy strategy, there is a need for
econometric models of the inflation process and the transmission mechanism. 11
2.3 Implementing Inflation Targeting: How to Model Such a Framework?
Svensson (1997) has argued that the solution to the potential problem in implementing
inflation targeting consists of making the central bank’s inflation forecast an explicit
intermediate target. He considered the following model:
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Where 1--= ttt pp is the inflation rate in year (t), pt is the log price level, yt is an
endogenous variable representing log output relative to potential output, xt is an exogenous
variable, it is the monetary policy instrument (the repo rate, for instance), and ( t , t and t )
are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) shocks in year (t) that are not known in the
previous year (t-1). The coefficients 1 , and 2 are assumed to be positive; the other
coefficients are assumed to be nonnegative; 1 and in addition fulfill 1 < 1, < 1. The
change in inflation is increasing in lagged output and the lagged exogenous variable. Output is
serially correlated, decreasing in the lagged real repo rate, (it - t ) and increasing in the lagged
exogenous variable. The long-run natural output level is normalized to equal zero. The
monetary policy instrument affects output with a one-year lag, and hence inflation with a two-
year lags. That the instrument affects inflation with a longer lag than it affects output is the
crucial property of the model. It is consistent with results from a number of Vector Auto-
regression (VAR) studies.12
If monetary policy is conducted by a central bank with an inflation target, then inflation
targeting can be interpreted as implying that the central bank’s objective in period (t) is to
choose a sequence of current and future monetary policy instrument {it} ¥=t , so as to minimize:
11 Amato and Gerlach (2002).
12 For instance, as in Fuhrer and Moore (1995). See, Svensson (1997, p. 1116)
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Where Et denotes expectations conditional upon (the central bank’s) information available in
year (t), the discount factor fulfills 0 < < 1, and the period loss function )( tL is:
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That is, the central bank wishes to minimize the expected sum of discounted squared future
deviations of inflation from the target. It is crucial here that inflation targeting is interpreted as
implying a single goal; that the inflation rate is the only variable in the period loss function
(equation (5)).
Furthermore, Svensson (1997) has pointed out that inflation targeting may be implemented
by central banks through involving additional goals for output or employment. He has
considered a situation when there is a long-run inflation target * , but no long-run output
target (other than the natural rate of output), since monetary policy cannot affect output in the
long run. In the short run, he has supposed that the goal of monetary policy was to stabilize
both inflation and output around the long-run inflation target and natural output rate,
respectively. Thus, in the goals for monetary policy, there is a symmetry between inflation and
output in the short run, but not in the long run. This situation can be described with a period
loss function
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Where, > 0 is the relative weight on output stabilization. The intertemporal loss function is
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So, it is clear that the case examined where inflation rate was the overriding goal corresponds to
= 0 in equation (6).
Alternatively, Masson et al. (1997) have expressed the implementation of the inflation
targeting regime as the following feedback rule:
Rt = )( * jt
e
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Where, (Rt ) represents the preferred instrument of monetary policy, k is the rate of
inflation in period k, e jt+ is the authorities’ expected rate of inflation in period (t+j)
conditional on information at time t ( assuming no subsequent policy changes), * jt+ is the
inflation target for period (t+j), is feedback parameter and (j) is the number of periods it
takes for the policy instrument (R) to have its maximum effect on inflation.
The feedback rule (8) shows clearly that in order to follow an inflation targeting procedure
the monetary authority must have a well-defined inflation target ( * ), a preferred policy
instrument, approximate knowledge of  (j), and some view of the expected rate of inflation in
period (t+ j). Therefore, what distinguishes inflation targeting from other frameworks for
conducting monetary policy, is not the accuracy of the forecasting techniques employed in the
procedure but the fact that the setting of policy instrument relies on a systematic assessment of
expected inflation, rather than on past or current inflation developments or an otherwise
assumption about future inflation.
3. Review of the Literature:
A substantial literature has investigated the optimal design of monetary policy framework,
for instance: Barro and Gordon (1983), Rogoff (1985), Svensson (1997) suggest that
governments have to delegate monetary policy to a central bank that is instrument independent
and appropriately conservative 13. Central bank independence and conservatism eliminate the
inflation bias of monetary policy that results from the incentive to exploit surprise inflation to
raise output in the short run above its natural level, which is typically assumed to be
inefficiently low. 14
Varieties of solutions to the problem of inflation bias have been proposed. One influential
mean; is the adoption of inflation targeting; which involves commitment of a central bank to the
pursuit of an assigned target. 15
On the other hand, the widespread consensus among central bankers and economists about
the importance of inflation targeting as a framework for conducting monetary policy is a result
of large debates about two polar strategies, termed "rules" and "discretion".
13 By appropriately conservative, this literature means that the central bank’s output and/or inflation targets should
be lower than the socially optimal ones and that the central bank should put more weight on inflation stabilization
and less on output stabilization than society does. See, Dixit and Lambertini (2003).
For instance, Rogoff (1985, p.1169) has considered an institutional response to the time-consistency problem facing
the monetary authority through appointing "conservatives" to head the central bank, or giving the central bank
concrete incentives to achieve an intermediate monetary target.
14 Refer to Dixit and Lambertini (2003).
15 Refer to Woodford (2003).
For instance, the advocates of rules (e.g. the fixed rule for money growth proposed by
Milton Friedman or a gold standard) have argued that "tying the hands" of policymakers will
prevent the monetary authorities from implementing counter- productive attempts at short-run
stabilization and will thus eliminate the inflationary bias inherent in discretionary monetary
policy. On the other hand, supporters of discretionary policymaking - under which the central
bank is left free to "do the right thing" as economic conditions evolve - stress the inability of
ironclad rules to deal with unforeseen shocks or changes in the structure of the economy.
Therefore, the two authors have argued that inflation targeting can be viewed as "constrained
discretion", rather than as a rigid policy rule.16
Another important debate in the academic circles is about the objectives of the monetary
policy. In this context, intellectual developments have contributed to the fading reputation of
strongly activist monetary policies that can be defined as policies whose purpose is to keep
output and unemployment close to their “full employment” levels at all times.
Three such developments have been considered as influential: (1) Milton Friedman’s
monetarist critique, particularly his observation that monetary policy works only with “ long
and variable lags ”; (2) the conclusion, that has been reached by Friedman and Edmund Phelps,
that there is no long-run tradeoff between inflation and unemployment; and (3) the agreement
regarding the potential importance of central bank credibility to the effectiveness of monetary
policy. 17
In addition, some studies have shown that, in the long run, inflation—at least at double digit
levels—is negatively correlated with economic growth (for example: Barro (1995) and Fischer
(1995)). High inflation also leads to more variability in future inflation which can be costly for
the economy. In the short run, however, there is a positive correlation between growth and
inflation. If authorities have discretion to choose between multiple objectives of price stability
and economic growth, there is an incentive to create “surprise” inflation, particularly in the run-
up to elections. This time-inconsistency problem leads to an inflationary policy bias.
Therefore, the inability of monetary policy to boost employment in the long run, the high
costs of inflation, and the time inconsistency problem has resulted in the conclusion that the
overriding, long run goal of monetary policy has to be price stability.
For more details, refer to Bernanke and Mishkin (1997).16
17 Refer to Bernanke et al. (1999).
In order to understand the importance of price stability as a prime objective in the inflation
targeting framework, Meyer (2002) has mentioned that it is recognized that even if the
relationship between money growth and inflation has weakened, perhaps because of financial
innovations, central banks can achieve their inflation targets by adjusting their preferred
instrument, typically some short-term interest rate. Hence, monetary policy still determines the
rate of inflation in the long-run. While it is also well understood that supply shocks (such as
abrupt changes in the price of energy or food unrelated to the overall balance between
aggregate demand and supply) can result in short-run changes in inflation, such changes in
inflation can persist only if central banks accommodate them.
Central banks therefore must accept full responsibility for inflation in the long run and have
the tools to achieve price stability. While monetary policy can achieve a long-run inflation
target, economic theory suggests that it cannot affect the level of output or its growth rate in the
long-run, other than by maintaining low and stable inflation. Therefore, the objective of price
stability can be assigned to monetary policymakers, but the objective of high and rising living
standards can not be.
Moreover, the adoption of inflation targeting regime, has paved the way towards an
intensive body of the literature that has tried to assess such a framework and to investigate its
economic effects on inflation, output and interest rates (for instance: Bernanke and Mishkin
(1997) have discussed the inflation targeting framework as a new strategy. They have
concluded that this approach has a number of advantages, including more transparent and
coherent policymaking, the increased accountability, and the greater attention to long-run
considerations in day-to-day policy debates and decisions).
3.1 The Relevant Literature Regarding the Assessment of the Impact of Inflation Targeting
Framework on Macroeconomic Variables in Industrialized Countries:
Inflation targeting as a framework for monetary policy has been first adopted by industrial
countries like New Zealand, Canada, the United Kingdom and Sweden in the early 1990s. In
most cases, the adoption of this framework is a response to difficulties in conducting monetary
policy using an exchange rate peg or some monetary aggregate as an intermediate target.
Masson et al. (1997) have highlighted those developments.
Therefore, since mid-1990s an extensive body of papers has tried to investigate the impact of
the inflation-targeting framework on economic performance. In what follows, there is a review
of those contributions.
Mishkin and Posen (1997) have estimated a three-variable unrestricted Vector Auto-
regression (VAR) model of core inflation, Gross domestic Product (GDP) growth, and the
central bank’s overnight instrument interest rate from the second quarter of 1971 to the date of
target adoption in four countries. The two authors have suggested that targeting inflation —
whether directly, as in New Zealand, Canada, and the United Kingdom, or as the basis for a
monetary targeting regime, as in Germany — can be considered as a useful strategy for the
conduct of monetary policy. Furthermore, they have mentioned that there is no evidence that
inflation targeting can produce undesirable effects on the real economy in the long-run; instead,
it more likely to improve the climate for economic growth.
Moreover, Honda (2000) has argued that there is no empirical evidence that inflation
targeting has changed macroeconomic variables in the unrestricted VAR context using data for
three inflation targeters: New Zealand, Canada, and the United Kingdom. He has calculated the
standard Chow test statistics. The results have showed that there is no possibility to reject the
null hypothesis of no structural change in all countries at the significance level of 5%.
Interestingly, Bernanke and Mihov (1998) have used a similar Chow test that also has failed to
reject the no-change null hypothesis in a different context of a VAR model.
Alternatively, Johnson (2002) has assessed the effect of introducing inflation targets on
expected inflation in eleven developed countries 18 . He has found strong evidence that the
period after the announcement of inflation targets were associated with a large reduction in the
level of expected inflation. This indicates for some degree a desirable impact of inflation
targeting adoption.
In their paper, Ball and Sheridan (2005) have analyzed the impact of inflation targeting on
economic performance in twenty members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) 19 . They have found that the examination of inflation-targeting countries
leads to the conclusion that their economic performance has improved on average between the
period before targeting and the targeting period. For example, inflation has become more stable,
and output growth has been stabilized. However, countries that have not adopted inflation
18 Johnson’s paper has included five inflation targeting countries: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Sweden and the
United Kingdom as well as six non-targeting countries: France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Japan and the
United States.
19 Ball and Sheridan have used data for seven OECD countries that adopted inflation targeting in the early 1990s:
Australia, Canada, Finland, Spain, Sweden, United .Kingdom, and New Zealand and thirteen that did not adopt it:
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Irelands, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United
States and Switzerland. They excluded the emerging-market economies from their analysis. In addition, they
excluded countries that lacked an independent currency before the Euro (Luxembourg) or had experienced annual
inflation over 20% since 1984 (such as: Greece, Iceland, and Turkey). See, Ball and Sheridan (2005, p.251).
targeting also experienced improvements around the same times as targeters. This finding
implies that better performance is attributed to something other than inflation targeting.
Angeriz and Arestis (2008) have applied an Intervention Analysis to Multivariate
Structural Time Series Models to a number of OECD countries 20. Their results demonstrate
that both the inflation targeting and the non-targeting central banks have been successful in
achieving low inflation rates.
The above-mentioned contribution in the literature shows a controversial opinion about the
impact of inflation targeting on economic performance in industrialized countries. Hence, there
is no final word on the remarkable advantage of inflation targeting in this context.
3.2 The Relevant Literature Regarding the Assessment of the Impact of Inflation Targeting
in Emerging Market Economies:-
Mishkin (2000) has discussed the advantages and disadvantages of inflation targeting
strategy in emerging-market countries 21 .He has mentioned that, although this strategy is
not a panacea and may not be appropriate for many of those countries; it can be a highly
useful monetary policy in a number of them. Mishkin has illustrated a critical issue for
inflation targeting in emerging market countries that is the role of the exchange rate.
Emerging market countries, including those engaging in inflation targeting, have rightfully
been reluctant to adopt an attitude of "benign neglect" of exchange rate movements, partly
because of the existence of a sizable stock of foreign currency or a high degree of (partial)
dollarization.
Nonetheless, emerging market countries probably have gone too far, for too long, in the
direction of limiting exchange rate flexibility, not only through the explicit use of exchange
rate bands, but also through frequent intervention in the foreign exchange market.
Responding too heavily and too frequently to movements in a "flexible" exchange rate runs
the risk of transforming the exchange rate into a nominal anchor for monetary policy that
takes precedence over the inflation target, at least in the eyes of the public. One possible
way to avoid this problem is for inflation targeting central banks in emerging market
countries to adopt a transparent policy of smoothing short-run exchange rate fluctuations
20 Angeriz and Arestis have included in their sample only OECD countries: Australia, Canada, Finland, South
Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. The United States (US) and
the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), have been included as the control group as they do not pursue inflation
targeting
21 Mishkin has included transition countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in the emerging market
category.
that helps mitigate potentially destabilizing effects of abrupt exchange rate changes while
making it clear to the public that they will allow exchange rates to reach their market-
determined level over longer horizons. 22
Furthermore, Minella et al. (2003) have argued that inflation targeting in emerging
market economies has been a more challenging task than in developed economies. The
conduct of monetary policy has to build credibility and reduce inflation rate levels, and
simultaneously deal with a greater vulnerability to shocks.
In a similar point of view, Harjes and Ricci (2008, p. 3) have stated that:
“Several authors, including Calvo (2001) and Mishkin (2004) have pointed to the specific
difficulties that emerging market economies may face in conducting inflation targeting. First,
credibility issues may weaken the design of optimal macroeconomic policy in these countries, and
may reduce the effectiveness of monetary policy. Second, weak institutions may lead to currency
substitution or liability dollarization, or even fiscal dominance, largely reducing the capability of the
monetary authorities to target inflation effectively. Third, large exchange rate and other external
shocks complicate the conduct of monetary policy, by introducing substantial volatility” .
In this context, Amato and Gerlach (2002) have assessed the experience of emerging
market economies in the adoption of inflation targeting, they have pointed out two main
conclusions. First, in most cases inflation targeting has been introduced successfully
without the economy in question satisfying the preconditions that play such an important
role in the current literature. Second, exchange rate objectives may play a relatively greater
role in emerging market economies, primarily due to the financial structure of these
economies. In particular, during disinflations, inflation targets have coexisted with
exchange rate targets, and while there have been conflicts, central banks have typically
interpreted the inflation objective as the overriding goal of policy and acted accordingly. As
the transition to low inflation progressed, formal exchange rate bands are broadened and,
more recently, relinquished.
On the other hand, some authors have concentrated their assessment on specific
countries. For instance: Schmidt-Hebbel and Werner (2002) have reviewed the recent
inflation targeting experiences of Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, by using descriptive statistics
and estimating impulse responses of headline and core inflation to inflation target shocks,
based on VAR model estimations for each country. In addition, they have compared the
22 Refer to Mishkin (2000).
three countries’ performance under inflation targeting to the performance of a control group
of eleven other inflation targeting economies. 23
They have indicated that the three countries started from very different initial conditions
and adopted strikingly different approaches to introducing inflation targeting. Furthermore,
the three countries have been successful in meeting inflation targets and attaining relatively
low sacrifice ratios and output volatility levels after adopting inflation targeting.
Whereas, Roger and Stone (2005) have concluded that emerging market economies
appear to have generally higher levels of inflation variability than industrial countries. On
the other hand, the generally successful experience of emerging market countries with full-
fledged inflation targeting shows that inflation targeting is a viable alternative to an
exchange rate anchor given the right circumstances and policies.
Gonçalves and Salles (2008) have reproduced Ball and Sheridan’s (2005) analysis using
data for 36 developing economies, 13 of which have implemented the inflation targeting
framework. 24 Their results suggest that the choice of the inflation targeting regime proved
beneficial for emerging economies. In particular, their findings are as follows: (i) the
greater fall in inflation experienced by emerging market targeters can, to some extent, be
attributed to the regime itself and not only to mean reversion; (ii) those choosing to
inflation target have achieved a greater reduction in growth volatility than those opting for
alternative monetary policy arrangements. Moreover, the claim that inflation targeting
regimes hinder economic growth is clearly not sustained by the empirical evidence.
In sum, the literature so far suggests that the adoption of inflation targeting by
emerging economies contributes towards the attainment of superior outcomes in terms of
economic performance. The above discussion shows that the adoption of inflation targeting
is an appropriate option to emerging market economies.
23 Schmidt-Hebbel and Werner (2002) have mentioned that comparing the performance of Brazil, Chile and Mexico
with that of the control group was demanding for those three countries because the control group comprises
economies that, on average, were stable and performed well: Australia, Canada, Colombia, Finland, Israel, Korea,
New Zealand, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
24 The inflation targeters in the sample are Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Israel, Mexico, Peru,
Philippines, Poland, South Africa, South Korea and Thailand. The group of non-targeters is comprised by Argentina,
Bulgaria, China, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, India, Indonesia,
Lebanon, Malaysia, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela, Singapore and
Taiwan. See, Gonçalves and Salles (2008).
4. Overview of The Monetary Policy Performance in Brazil, Chile and South
Africa:-
This section illustrates the monetary policy adopted in the three countries that are in the core
interest of this paper. The main aim of this section is to investigate the main reasons behind the
move towards the announcement of inflation targeting regime.
4.1. The Monetary Policy Performance in Brazil:-
In Brazil, the monetary policy of the Real Plan 25 has been marked by the high priority
placed on initially accomplishing and thereafter maintaining price stability. In July 1994,
quarterly targets for the monetary aggregates have been introduced to build-up confidence that
there will be no inflationary financing of the government deficit. In order to prevent the upturn
in private spending (stemming from pent-up demand) from adversely affecting prices, credit
expansion was initially constrained by the imposition of a 100% marginal reserve requirement.
Subsequently, restraints have been placed on various forms and maturities of credit operations.
The swift growth of narrow monetary aggregates at the outset of the Real Plan has been mainly
determined by the large increase in the transactions component of the demand for money,
which in turn to the desired interest rate path.
The Real plan has successfully led to the reduction in inflation from above 2000 percent to
1.5 percent in 1998. However, the Brazilian government has not been as successful in
implementing much needed fiscal reforms. Following concerns about the fiscal balance, the
Real has come under speculative attack at the end of 1998 and collapsed in January 1999. As a
consequence of strong pressures on foreign exchange reserves, the BCB has been forced to
abandon the crawling peg to the dollar. 26 After a brief attempt to conduct a controlled
devaluation, the Real has been forced to float on January 15. Hence, the BCB has
acknowledged the need to put in place a nominal anchor and introduced an inflation targeting
regime on 21 June, 1999. 27
25 This plan has been introduced in 1994 and targeted mainly the Brazilian currency.
26 Under this exchange rate regime, the currency is adjusted periodically in small amounts at a fixed rate or in
response to changes in selective quantitative indicators, such as past inflation differentials vis-à-vis major trading
partners, differentials between the inflation target and expected inflation in major trading partners. The rate of crawl
can be set to adjust for measured inflation or other indicators (backward looking), or set at a preannounced fixed rate
and/or below the projected inflation differentials (forward looking). Maintaining a crawling peg imposes constraints
on monetary policy in a manner similar to a fixed peg system. Refer to: the International Monetary Fund (2006 (a)).
27 Refer to Levin et al. (2004, p. 64) and Bogdanski et al. (2000, pp.7-8).
It worth mentioning that before the adoption of inflation targeting regime, the BCB has
never been granted formal instrument independence to conduct monetary policy. Moreover,
even at the Bank, very few staff members knew what an inflation targeting framework was
about. This coincides with the remark by Mishkin (2004); that the independence of Brazil’s
central bank and the commitment to price stability, however, have not been clearly achieved.
Both are based on a presidential decree and confidence in a superb central bank president, but
not on a more formal commitment based on legislation.
On the same date of the adoption of inflation targeting framework for the conduct of
monetary policy, the President of Brazil has issued a decree instituting it.
The regime contains all the key elements of an inflation targeting strategy, namely; (1) the
announcement of multi-year inflation targets with explicit numerical targets for the 12-month
rate of inflation in the years 1999, 2000 and 2001, and a commitment to announce the targets
for 2002 onwards two years in advance ; (2) assigning to the National Monetary Council the
responsibility for setting the inflation targets and tolerance ranges based on a proposal by the
Minister of Finance; (3) giving to the BCB full responsibility to implement the policies needed
to attain the inflation targets; (4) establishing procedures to increase the central bank’s
accountability specifically, if the target range is breached, the central bank president would
have to issue an open letter to the Minister of Finance explaining the causes of the deviation,
the measures that will be taken to eliminate it, and the time it will take to get inflation back
inside the tolerance range; and (5) taking actions to improve the transparency of monetary
policy concretely. 28
Afterwards, the National Monetary Council has issued a Resolution on June 30th, 1999 to
define the price index used as well as the inflation targets. The Broad Consumer Price Index
(IPCA) reported by the National Bureau of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) has been chosen
for the purpose of gauging inflation targets. The targets have been announced at 8% for 1999,
6% for 2000 and 4% for 2001 with tolerance intervals of ±2% for each year.
The inflation targeting regime in Brazil has been subject to severe shocks due to a domestic
energy crisis, adjustments in administered prices, and a depreciating exchange rate, which has
been later exacerbated by pre-election uncertainty.
28 The (BCB) was requested to issue a quarterly Inflation Report modelled after that produced by the Bank of
England. Refer to Mishkin and Savastano (2001, p.440).
The authorities have reacted with significant foreign exchange intervention to prevent
vulnerabilities to further shocks resulted from tightening the monetary policy in October 2002,
after that the Net International Reserves (NIR) has declined by US$ 13 billion. 29
As Minella et al. (2003) have showed, the inflation-targeting mechanism has played a key
role in macroeconomic stabilization in Brazil. In spite of large inflationary shocks, the inflation
rate has been maintained at a low level. Exchange rate depreciations in 2001 and 2002 have
been considered as stress tests for the regime. In particular, in 2002, monetary policy has faced
a confidence crisis in the future performance of the Brazilian economy and an increase in risk
aversion in international markets.
Those negative consequences have been reflected by turmoil in the domestic financial
market, by difficulties in public debt management and by a steep decrease of foreign credit
flows, negatively affecting both inflation and the level of activity. This in turn has resulted in
the non-fulfillment of the target of inflation rate as indicated by the measured rate of the change
in the Broad Consumer Price Index (IPCA). This rate has reached 12.5% in 2002, above the
upper limit of the tolerance interval of 2 percentage points above and below the 3.5% central
target set for the year.
As of January 2004, inflation has appeared poised to drop back within the inflation targeting
range. Twelve-month-ahead inflation expectations have dropped to 5.6 percent by December
and monetary policy had loosened substantially, suggesting that the cycle of overshooting has
ended. Other indicators have been positive, including a sharp drop in external debt spreads, a
reduction in the debt to GDP ratio, and an expected recovery of growth.
The above improvement is evident in figure (1) where the net public debt to GDP ratio
declined from 52% in January 2004 to 40.4% in June 2008.
Source: The Brazilian Central Bank. Time series available at: http://www.bcb.gov.br/?NPDBREAKDOWN
29 Refer to the International Monetary Fund (2006 (b), p.41).
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Figure(1) Brazil: Net Public Debt to GDP ratio
In addition, table (1) indicates an improvement in macroeconomic indicators in Brazil after
the adoption of inflation targeting. The deficit in the current account has turned from a deficit of
18.4 billion of US$ in 1995 into surplus of 4.2 billion of US$ in 2003 and 1.7 billion of US$ in
2007. Inflation rate has declined from 22.4% in 1995 to 4.5% in 2007. Economic growth has
reached 5.4% in 2007 compared to 4.2% in 1995.
Table(1): Macroeconomic Indicators in Brazil 1995-2007
Annual rate of
Economic Growth
(%) **
Inflation rate
(%)*
Surplus or Deficit in the Current
Account
(Billion of US$)
Years
4.222.4-18.41995
2.29.6-23.51996
3.45.2-30.51997
0.01.5-33.41998
0.38.9-25.31999
4.36.0-24.22000
1.37.7-23.22001
2.712.5-7.62002
1.19.34.22003
5.77.611.72004
3.25.714.02005
3.83.113.62006
5.44.51.72007
Source: The Brazilian Central Bank(BCB). Time series available at: http://www.bcb.gov.br/?TIMESERIESEN
Notes: * measured as a percentage change in the Broad Consumer Price Index (IPCA).
** Percentage change of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
Investigating the Brazilian experience with inflation targeting regime shows that the
inflation targets as well as the upper and lower limits have been modified many times during
the period 1999-2007. The current target is to achieve 4.5% with tolerance intervals of ±2% for
each year. This target is aimed till 2009. 30
30 Refer to table (A-2) in the appendix that illustrates the Brazilian inflation targeting regime.
The above discussion shows that the adoption of inflation targeting framework was a
consequence to difficulties that the economy has faced and this framework helped to achieve
confidence in the Brazilian economy and credibility of monetary policy.
4.2. The Monetary Policy Performance in Chile:-
After a decade of moderate but stubborn inflation, the recently independent Central Bank
of Chile (CBC) 31 has faced in 1990 various choices in its attempts to bring down inflation.
Chile’s inflation history records two major stabilization programs based on a nominal exchange
rate anchor: 1959-1962 and 1979-1982. Both programs failed badly – reducing the possibility
of a credible using of exchange rate anchor for a third time to bring inflation down on a
sustained basis. On the other hand, the use of monetary aggregates as an intermediate target
would have been difficult in a country with developing financial markets and volatile demands
for monetary aggregates. Therefore, the remaining choice for a monetary framework was
inflation targeting.
Chile is considered as the second country in adopting inflation targeting in the world,
setting its first annual target in September 1990 for the following year. Since then, Chile’s
Central Bank has used inflation targeting to bring inflation down from 27% in 1990 to low,
stationary levels that are consistent with the indefinite target range of 2–4% per year.
As part of the process of hardening the targets, in September 1994 the CBC has started to
announce point targets rather than target ranges for its inflation objective for the following year.
However, in 1999, the central bank explicitly has announced a multi-year target for inflation
consisting of a target of 3.5% for the year 2000, and a longer term target of 2–4% for 2001
onwards.
The focus on the exchange rate has resulted in a serious policy mistake in 1998. In the
aftermath of the Asian crisis and then the meltdown in Russia, the CBC has been reluctant to
ease monetary policy and let the exchange rate depreciate in order to cushion the effects of a
substantial negative term of trade shock. Instead, the central bank has raised interest rates
sharply and narrowed its exchange rate band. As a result, the inflation target has been undershot
and the economy entered a recession for the first time under the inflation targeting regime.
31 Before embarking on inflation targeting, Chile passed new central bank legislation in 1989 (that took effect in
1990), which gave independence to the central bank and mandated price stability as one of its primary objectives.
See, Mishkin (2000, p.107).
- For the Chilean experience, refer to: Landerretche et al. (1999, pp 9-10), Schmidt - Hebbel and Tapia
(2002, pp. 125-126), Levin et al. (2004, p.63), Betancour et al. (2008, p. 159).
Not surprisingly given those outcomes, the central bank has been severely criticized. During
1999, the central bank has reversed course, eased monetary policy by lowering interest rates,
and allowed the peso to depreciate.
A key feature of the Chilean experience has been the gradual approach to disinflation,
which has produced low inflation without suffering excessively large output costs. Chile had an
exchange rate band around a crawling peg until August 1999; it has since adopted a fully
floating exchange rate regime. Inflation targeting in Chile has been generally successful in
bringing down inflation, even though a strong fiscal position and a sound financial system
played an important role in supporting this performance. Furthermore, in 1999–2000 the Bank
has upgraded its monetary framework to full-fledged inflation targeting. This includes
disposing of the exchange rate band by adopting a dirty float, developing the Bank’s modelling
and forecasting capability, and adopting a comprehensive communications strategy to enhance
policy transparency and credibility. The latter comprises publication of the schedule and
minutes of monetary policy meetings (the latter with a three-month lag) and a regular inflation
report with inflation and growth projections.
As an assessment of the Chilean experience Céspedes and Soto (2006) have showed that the
move to a full-fledged inflation-targeting framework was seen as the natural step after reaching
the steady-state level of inflation and establishing sufficient credibility in monetary policy. It
was triggered, in part, by the macroeconomic outcomes of the Asian crisis. GDP growth has
declined significantly in 1998–99, while the annual inflation rate has dropped from 4.6 percent
in 1998 to 2.3 percent in 1999. These events have forced the monetary authority to substantially
enhance its macroeconomic framework through the adoption of a free-floating exchange rate
regime, the deepening of the foreign exchange derivatives market, and the total opening of the
capital account.
Over the same period, the Chilean economy has gone through several important structural
changes. The financial sector has deepened, and the degree of openness to external economic
influences has increased, with unilateral tariff reductions and the signing of many free trade
agreements, most notably with the United States and the European Union. The 1990s has
proved to be the Chilean economy’s best decade for growth in its history. Although growth has
moderated in the present decade, it is still very high from both a historical and a regional
perspective. Inflation has declined to levels comparable to those in the industrial economies,
and the volatility of both output and inflation has fallen significantly. With these achievements,
Chile can be considered a good example of what has been called the “great moderation”, a
phenomenon seen in many countries in recent decades in which not only the level of inflation
but also the volatility of both inflation and output has declined sharply. Figure (2) indicates the
“great moderation” phenomenon as there is a decline in inflation from 17% in 1989 to 4.4% in
2007. This implies an advantage of the adoption of inflation targeting regime that enabled the
monetary authority to capture inflation. In addition, there is a decline in the annual economic
growth from 24.3% in 1989 to 10.3% in 2007.
Figure (2): Annual Change in the Consumer Price Index and Annual
Economic Growth in Chile
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Finance Statistics Database.
* Annual Economic Growth is calculated as percentage change of Gross Domestic Product.
4.3. The Monetary Policy Performance in South Africa:-
The monetary policy frameworks in South Africa comprise five broad frameworks. First,
there was a liquid asset ratio-based system with quantitative controls over interest rates and
credit up to the early 1980s. In the liquid asset ratio-based system the interest rate played a
minor part as a corrective instrument whereas the main form of monetary control was achieved
through liquid asset requirements. Second, the period from 1981 to 1985 represents a transition
period. Third, explicit monetary growth targets and later guidelines for M3 are announced
annually from 1986 to 1998. The pre-announced monetary targets have to be achieved
indirectly by adjusting interest rates. The short-term interest rate has become the main monetary
policy instrument as the Reserve Bank’s discount rate has been employed to influence the cost
of overnight collateralized lending and hence market interest rates. In order to reduce demand
for bank credit, Bank rate has increased. Financial liberalization and other structural
developments in the 1990s have resulted in a changed relationship between growth in money
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supply, output and prices, and significantly reduced the usefulness of money supply targets.
These targets have been subsequently formally supplemented by a broader set of indicators that
included the exchange rate, asset prices, the output gap, the balance of payments, wage
settlements, total credit extension and the fiscal stance. Policy increasingly moved towards
greater transparency, aimed at achieving greater credibility and a more pronounced effect on
inflation expectations. Fourth, from March 1998 the M3 growth guidelines have been set for a
three-year period and an informal inflation target of 1 to 5 per cent was set for the first time.
The new monetary system has effectively rationed the amount of liquidity. 32
Finally, in February 2000, the “Formal Inflation Targeting” 33 has been adopted in South
Africa as the monetary policy framework. Before this announcement “Informal Inflation
Targeting” 34 has already applied by the South African Reserve Bank (SARB). Considerable
emphasis was placed on the attainment of price stability, but the period over which this would
be achieved was not specified. At first, the framework also differed from formal inflation
targeting because an intermediate target, the growth in money supply, anchored monetary
policy decisions. Later, towards the end of the 1990s, the Reserve Bank moved to “eclectic”
35or “pragmatic” inflation targeting. In this framework, developments in the monetary
aggregates have been regarded as vital elements in the inflation process, but the Bank closely
monitored developments in other financial and real indicators in reaching a decision on the
appropriate level of short-term interest rates.
South Africa has adopted the inflation targeting framework; at a time when the country’s
inflation performance has been continuing to improve (falling to 5.2 percent in 1999 from 8.6
percent in 1997 and 6.9 percent in 1998). The inflation objective expressed in terms of an
adjusted inflation rate, the headline consumer price index excluding mortgage interest costs.
The government announced the first inflation target after consultations with the South
African Reserve Bank (SARB) and the framework initially included an escape clause for major
unforeseen events outside central bank control. The target was an annual average inflation rate
32 Refer to Casteleijn (2001, pp. 4-5).
33 Most of the articles that tackled the experience of South Africa refer to the announcement of Inflation Targeting
regime as an implementation of the “Full-Fledged Inflation Targeting Framework (FFIT)” ; some other papers refer
to such an announcement as the “Formal Inflation Targeting” . However, I believe that both refer to the same
framework where there is an explicit inflation target and the Reserve Bank of South Africa is committed to achieve it
during a specific period.
34 This implies that the Reserve Bank of South Africa had an informal goal of maintaining inflation at a level that
would be more or less in line with the average inflation rate in South Africa's major trading partners and international
competitors. See, Agénor (2000, p.46).
35 This coincides with the “Implicit Price Stability Anchor (IPSA)” regime mentioned (in section 2) of this paper due
to the classification by Carare and Stone (2006).
of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) excluding mortgage costs (CPIX). A 3–6 percent target has
been announced for 2002 and 2003, and a 3–5 percent target for 2004 and 2005. No explicit
target has been decided for the transition period between February 2000 and 2002. The target
range reflects the uncertainties about the inflation process and the required discretion in
monetary policy. The fiscal and external positions of South Africa have improved since the
adoption of inflation targeting.
This medium-term target has been agreed upon in view of estimated lags between
monetary policy decisions and their impact on inflation: changes in interest rates in South
Africa have been estimated to take from 18 to 24 months to affect inflation. The relatively large
width of the band has been chosen to account for the fact that the targeted price index includes
a large number of volatile items, whose movements are beyond the control of the Reserve
Bank. Attempts to improve transparency have taken the form of public explanations of the
monetary policy stance following meetings of the Monetary Policy Committee of the Reserve
Bank, the creation of a Monetary Policy Forum that meets twice a year (in May and
November), and the publication of a semi-annual Monetary Policy Review (twice a year
beginning in 2001).
The following table shows the developments in the monetary policy in South Africa since
1960s till present.
Table (2): The Evolution of South Africa’s Monetary Policy Framework
Years Monetary Policy Regime
1960-1981 Liquid asset ratio-based system with quantitative controls on
interest rates and credit
1981-1985 Mixed system during transition
1986-1998 Cost of cash reserves-based system with pre-announced
monetary targets (M3)
1998-1999 Daily tenders of liquidity through repurchase transactions (repo
system), plus pre-announced (M3) targets and targets for core
inflation
2000- present Formal inflation targeting
Source: Casteleijn (2001, p.5).
The South African Reserve Bank’s key operational variable within its monetary policy
framework is the level of short-term interest rates. South African monetary authorities therefore
largely determine the level of short-term interest rates. The Bank is able to influence these rates
through its control over the bank repurchase (or repo) rate. To make the repo rate effective, the
Reserve Bank intervenes in the money market to create a shortage, that is, it drains excess
liquidity. By ensuring that a money market shortage exists at all times, it means that
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commercial banks are always indebted to the Reserve Bank and within its financial grip. The
monetary policy committee determines the repo rate, which represents the marginal cost of
money for the banks.
Figure(3): Monetary Policy Transmission Mechanism in South Africa
Source: Smal and de Jager (2001, p.5).
When the Reserve Bank decides to influence the change in the repo rate, it sets in motion a
series of economic events. Economists refer to this chain of developments as the “transmission
mechanism of monetary policy”. The main links in the transmission mechanism of monetary
policy, depicted in the flow chart in figure (3), which can be briefly described as follows: the
main instrument for monetary policy is the repo rate. This rate has direct effects on other
variables in the economy, such as other interest rates, the exchange rate, money and credit,
other asset prices and decisions on spending and investment. Therefore, changes in the repo rate
affect the demand for and supply of goods and services. The pressure of demand relative to the
supply capacity of the economy is a key factor influencing domestic inflationary pressures.
Inflation is, amongst others, the result of pressures originating in the labour market and/or the
market for goods and services as well because of imported inflation, which is influenced by
exchange rate movements.
Macroeconomic polices in South Africa have been impressive and currency substitution or
liability dollarization were virtually absent. In particular, the sharp depreciation of the rand in
2001-02 has proven that there was certainly no “fear of floating”36. However, like many other
emerging market countries, South Africa implementation of the inflation targeting strategy is
often challenged by large exogenous—often external—shocks. In the typical environment in
which many emerging markets operate—small open economies well integrated within a
globalized world—an essential tool for policymaking lies in a coherent forward-looking
framework for assessing the effect of external and domestic shocks on inflation, and for
gauging the appropriate policy response.
Due to those shocks, the inflation target has been overshot by an average of 3.7 percent
during the period of April 2002 to April 2003 in the wake of a sharp depreciation of the rand.
The overshooting peaked at 5.3 percent in October–November 2002. The overshooting has
been realized by the 35 percent depreciation of the rand during the last four months of 2001, an
increase in world oil and grain prices, and uncertainties regarding the loosening of exchange
controls. The (SARB) has attributed the currency depreciation to regional political instability
and an increase in international investor risk aversion with respect to emerging market
countries. There have been no major changes to the framework in response to the overshooting.
In October 2002, the Minister of Finance has announced that the 3–5 percent target for 2004
would be adjusted upward slightly to 3–6 percent. Similarly, in February 2003 the Minister has
announced that the 3–5 percent target for 2005 can also be adjusted to 3–6 percent.
The following figure illustrates the evolution of the percentage change in the consumer
price index during the inflation targeting period. It shows the two main indices the total (CPI)
and the (CPIX). As indicated from the figure the (CPIX) reflects the inflationary pressures that
the economy might face - due to external or domestic shocks- better than the overall (CPI). The
percentage change in the (CPI) reached 10.2% in the first quarter of 2008 compared with 13.3%
in the second quarter of 2002. Whereas, the (CPIX) reached almost 22% compared with 14.5%.
This indicates the importance of inflation targeting regime to mitigate the inflationary
pressures that the South African Economy is more likely to face during the coming period that
can be expected from analyzing figure 4.
36 This expression is used in the literature to indicate the fear of emerging market economies to move from pegged
exchange rate regimes to free floating. Indeed “fear of floating” is only part of more general “fear of large exchange
rate swings”, in emerging market economies. This reluctance to allow the exchange rate to adjust significantly and
rapidly is also manifest in the many episodes during which central banks go to great length to avoid a devaluation.
For more details refer to Calvo and Reinhart (2000, p.2).
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Figure (4): Percentage Change in the Consumer Price Index in South Africa
Source: South African Reserve Bank. Database available at: http://www.reservebank.co.za/
* The two series are seasonally adjusted at annual rate.
After this overview of the monetary policy frameworks in Brazil, Chile and South Africa, it
is obvious to end up with the following remark that the examples of Chile and Brazil illustrate
that inflation targeting is indeed feasible in emerging market economies, despite their more
complicated political and economic environment. Inflation targeting has been able to provide a
strong nominal anchor that can keep inflation expectations in check. However, this requires not
only a focus on good communication and transparency by the central bank, but also supportive
policies to develop strong fiscal, financial and monetary institutions. The Brazilian case
suggests that these policies do not have to be fully in place when inflation targeting is adopted
for it to produce good macroeconomic outcomes, but it is important to have a strong
commitment to develop these institutions and continuing vigilance that fiscal, financial and
monetary institutions will continue to be strengthened.
This coincides with the views of Mishkin and Savastano (2001, p. 441) who have stated that:
“Brazil has shown the way, indicating that an inflation targeting regime, with a high degree of
transparency and accountability can indeed be implemented quickly”
Furthermore, the success of the Chilean experience suggests that inflation targeting can be
used to promote gradual disinflation, even when inflation starts from double digit levels, and
that the gradual hardening of targets as inflation falls is an appropriate strategy to deal with the
controllability problems when inflation is initially high. Indeed, this strategy has been used by
Chile as well as many industrialized countries that adopted inflation targeting. 37
. (1999).et alBernankeandSee, Mishkin and Savastano (2001, p.435)37
The following table provides illustration of the inflation targeting framework in Brazil, Chile
and South Africa.
Table(3): Summary of Inflation Targeting Frameworks
Country Brazil Chile South Africa
Date of Announcement June 1999 September 1990 February 2000
Current Inflation Target 4.5 % 2–4% 3–6%
Inflation Report yes
Target Announcement Set by National
Monetary Council
composed by finance
minister, planning
minister and Central
Bank president
Central bank of Chile in
consultation with the
government
the government after
consultations with the
(SARB)
Monetary Policy
Objective
Price stability, sound
financial system
Price stability, functioning
payment system
Price stability
sound financial system
Other feature Letter from
The governor to the
minister of finance if
the target has been
breached
The (CBC)’s Press releases of
its monthly monetary policy
meeting provide explanation
of unforeseen events
the framework included
an escape clause for
major unforeseen
events outside central
bank control
Inflation Measure Broad consumer
price index
(IPCA)
The underlying CPI (the total
index excluding fruits,
vegetables, and fuels)
maintained by the National
Statistics Bureau (INE).
Core CPI
excluding raw food and
energy prices
Operating target Overnight interbank
rate (SELIC)
Real Overnight interbank rate The repo rate
Instrument Open market operations
Source: Levin et al. (2004, pp. 68-69).
* I have updated the information in accordance to the information provided in the website of the Brazilian
Central Bank, the Central Bank of Chile and the South African Reserve Bank.
As a final word, from my point of view, the South African experience provides a good
example for a transition period from informal to formal inflation targeting which could be
suitable for any emerging market economy that might be suffering from high rates of inflation
but still in doubt of the ability of inflation targeting framework in curbing inflation. Therefore,
by practicing such transition period it might improve the credibility of its monetary policy and
be confident to announce the adoption of full-fledged inflation targeting regime.
In conclusion, it is not necessarily, for the adoption of inflation targeting regime by the
emerging market economies that all the perquisites are fulfilled and the above experiences
reflects the positive impact of this framework.
5. The Empirical Model: A Background
Bagliano and Favero (1998) have pointed out that the Vector Auto-regression (VAR)
analyses of the monetary transmission mechanism started to develop because of the failure of
the traditional Cowles Commission models. This failure can be regarded as a result of two
demolishing theoretical critiques introduced by Lucas and Sims. On one hand, the Lucas (1976)
critique is related to structural models when the coefficient describing the impact of monetary
policy on the macroeconomic variables of interest depend on the monetary policy regimes; in
this case; no model estimated under a specific regime can be used to simulate the effects of a
different monetary policy regime. On the other hand, the Sims (1980) critique attacks
identification from a different perspective. Sims showed that the restrictions needed to support
exogeneity in structural Cowles Commission-type models 38 are ‘incredible’ in an environment
where agents optimize intertemporally.
In this context, Faust et al. (2004) have mentioned that the seminal paper of Sims (1980)
paved the way towards much attention to be devoted to studying the effects of monetary policy
on macroeconomic variables using a vector Auto-regression (VAR). This approach relies on
making identifying assumptions relating structural shocks to the reduced form errors of the
VAR. While, many identification approaches have been proposed for identifying VARs, the
most often adopted approach is applying short-run restrictions. These specify that some
structural shock has no contemporaneous effect on one or more variables. Faust et al. (2004)
have provided an example for short-run scheme where it may be assumed that monetary policy
has no contemporaneous effect on output and prices. Such identifying assumptions had been
used by Sims (1980) and in many other papers in the VAR literature, including Christiano et al.
(1996, 1999), Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Bernanke and Mihov (1998). Not only short-
run restrictions can be used in the estimated VAR, long-run approaches may be also used. An
example of such type of restrictions is the one that reflects the neutrality or super neutrality
arguments about the effects of monetary policy on real variables. (e.g. King and Watson (1997)
make the assumption that monetary policy shocks have no long-run effect on output, and show
38 Christ (1994, pp.47-49) has illustrated that in most of the Cowles theoretical work, the assumptions included the
following: (a) Economic behavior is governed by simultaneous equations, (b) The equations of the model are linear
in systematic variables and disturbances, (c) The systematic variables are observable, without error, (d) Variables
change at discrete time intervals, such as yearly, or quarterly, or monthly, rather than continuously, (e) It is known
which variables are exogenous, and which are predetermined, (f) The determinant of the coefficients of the jointly
dependent variables is not zero, so that the reduced form exists, (g) The predetermined variables are linearly
independent, so that their moment matrix can be inverted, (h) The structural equations are identified by a priori
restrictions on their parameters, (i) The disturbances are normally distributed random variables with zero means and
finite and constant variances and covariances are serially independent, and (k)The equation system is dynamically
stable.
that this long-run neutrality condition allows the identification of a very simple VAR).
Bernanke (1996) and Sims (1998) have argued that while extant studies of the effects of
monetary policy in a VAR differ greatly in their identifying assumptions and in the choice of
the variables in the system, these studies nonetheless tend to agree on the qualitative effect of
monetary policy shocks on macroeconomic variables and, in particular, to agree that monetary
policy shocks account for a small portion of the forecast error variance of output. For example,
Christiano et al. (1996, 1999) have obtained this conclusion in the recursive identification.
On the other hand, Structural VARs 39 require “identifying assumptions” that allow
correlations to be interpreted causally. These identifying assumptions can involve the entire
(VAR), so that all of the causal links in the model are spelled out, or just a single equation, so
that only a specific causal link is identified. This produces instrumental variables that permit the
contemporaneous links to be estimated using instrumental variables regression. 40
In addition, in Structural VAR modeling it is common that just-identified models are
considered. In other words, only as few restrictions are imposed as are necessary for obtaining
unique impulse responses. If at some stages of the analysis it turns out that further restrictions
are compatible with the data, it is also possible to impose them.
In this empirical section of the paper both VAR and Structural VAR approaches are used
due to the importance of the remark by Elbourne and de Haan (2005) who have argued that the
SVAR approach is better suited to small open economies than the Cholesky decomposition
from VAR, because it can capture more of the salient features of the economies. Furthermore,
they argued that VARs estimated over different policy regimes are misspecified and yield
unreliable results. This motivated the paper to estimate Structural VARs for the periods of
interest (i.e the pre-inflation targeting and the adoption periods) for three countries Brazil, Chile
and South Africa.
5.1. Estimation Approaches: Theoretical Framework:-
A reduced-form VAR, as proposed by Sims (1980), is a regression of some vector of
variables Yt on lags of this vector. Formally, the reduced-form VAR is a system of equations
that can be written in matrix form as:
tktktt uYAYAY ++++= -- ...11 (1)
39 The Structural VAR approach is widely implemented in many econometric software packages like: Eviews.
40 See, Stock and Watson (2001, p. 103).
Where is a vector of constants, A1,……….,Ak are matrices of coefficients, and ut is a
vector of innovations, that is, serially uncorrelated disturbances that have zero mean and a
variance-covariance matrix å= uttuuE )( ' . The evolution of the vector Yt , which contains
the macroeconomic variables whose behavior we seek to understand, depends both on
unexpected disturbances, ut , and on a systematic component, ktkt YAYA -- +++ ...11 , that
determines how the shocks are propagated to the rest of the economy. The estimates of , ,
A1,……….,Ak , are obtained by applying ordinary least squares (OLS) to each part of equation
(1) separately, and the estimate of åu is given by the sample covariance matrix of the OLS
residuals. Based on the estimated reduced-form VAR for different samples, it is possible to
determine whether the variance-covariance matrix åu of the shocks and the systematic
component—that is, the propagation mechanism—have changed over time. Through
counterfactual experiments, it is possible to determine whether the observed reduced volatility
in the main variables of interest has been due mainly to a change in the shocks or in the
propagation mechanism. 41
Also, I used Structural Vector Auto-regression (SVAR) estimation. The reason behind that
is Elbourne and de Haan (2005) who argued that the SVAR model as proposed by Kim and
Roubini (2000) yields much better results than a VAR with the same variables but using the
commonly used Cholesky decomposition.
Therefore, following Kim and Roubini (2000, pp. 565-566), the economy is described by a
structural form equation:-
G(L)yt =et (2)
Where G(L) is a matrix polynomial in the lag operator L, yt is an 1´n data vector, and et is
an 1´n structural disturbances vector. et is serially uncorrelated and Var (et)= L and L is a
diagonal matrix where diagonal elements are the variances of structural disturbances, therefore,
structural disturbances are assumed to be mutually uncorrelated.
A reduced form equation (VAR) can be estimated:
yt =B(L) yt + ut (3)
Where B(L) is a matrix polynomial (without the constant term) in lag operator L and
var(ut)=å .
41 Boivin and Giannoni (2002, p. 98).
There are several ways of recovering the parameters in the structural form equations from
the estimated parameters in the reduced form equation. Some methods give restrictions on only
contemporaneous structural parameters. A popular and convenient method is to orthogonalize
reduced form disturbance by Cholesky decomposition (as in Sims (1980) among others).
However, in this approach to identification, it is possible to assume only a recursive structure,
that is, a Wold-causal chain. Blanchard and Watson (1986), Bernanke (1986), and Sims (1986)
suggest a generalized method (Structural VAR) in which non-recursive structures are allowed
while still giving restrictions only on contemporaneous structural parameters.
Hence, let G0 be the coefficient matrix (non-singular) on L0 in G(L), that is, the
contemporaneous coefficient matrix in the structural form, and let G0(L) be the coefficient
matrix in G(L) without contemporaneous coefficient G0 . That is,
G(L)=  G0+  G0(L) (4)
Then, the parameters in the structural form equation and those in the reduced form equation are related
by
B(L)= )(10 LGG
o-- (5)
In addition, the structural disturbances and the reduced form residuals are related by et =G0ut , which
implies
'1
0
1
0
-- L=å GG (6)
Maximum likelihood estimates of L and G0 can be obtained only through sample estimates
ofå. The right-hand side of equation (6) has )1( +´ nn free parameters to be estimated. Since
åcontains )1( +´ nn /2 parameters, there is a need of at least )1( +´ nn /2 restrictions. By
normalizing n diagonal elements of G0 to 1's, there will be a need of at least )1( -´ nn /2
restrictions on G0 to achieve identification. In the VAR modeling with Cholesky
decomposition, G0 is assumed to be triangular. However, in the SVAR approach G0 can be any
structure as long as it has enough restrictions.
In this context, Buckle et al. (2002) have mentioned that there are several ways of
specifying the restrictions to achieve identification of the structural parameters. One procedure
for determining appropriate restrictions to identify a SVAR is to use the restrictions that are
implied from a fully specified macroeconomic model. For example: Blanchard and Watson
(1986), have used theory to incorporate short-run restrictions; Shapiro and Watson (1988) and
Blanchard and Quah (1989), have used theory to justify the inclusion of long-run restrictions,
and Gali (1992), has used theory to justify both short-run and long-run restrictions. Moreover,
Garratt, Lee, Pesaran and Shin (1998); Huh (1999) and Buckle, Kim and Tam (2001) have
followed this approach. The alternative and more common approach is to choose the set of
variables and identification restrictions that are broadly consistent with the preferred theory and
prior empirical research. The metric used to evaluate the appropriateness of the variables and
restrictions is whether the behaviour of the dynamic responses of the model is consistent with
the preferred theoretical view of the expected response. Recent attempts to identify monetary
policy effects in small open economies by Kim and Roubini (2000) and Brischetto and Voss
(1999) are some of the many examples of this second approach.
It worth mentioning that, this paper followed the second approach in imposing short-term
restrictions for the purpose of SVARs estimations.
On the other hand, another simple statistic- namely, the Likelihood Ratio (LR) statistic- has
been used in order to provide a test for structural changes due to the adoption of inflation
targeting framework in Brazil, Chile and South Africa. Following Hamilton (1994, p. 297) the
log (LR) statistic is:
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Where: *1L and
*
0L are the maximum values for the log likelihood obtained from the
unrestricted and restricted VARs, respectively. 1
Ù
W and 0
Ù
W are the variance- covariance
matrices of residuals obtained from unrestricted and restricted VARs. Whereas, T is the total
number of observations. Under the null hypothesis, this test asymptotically has a
2X distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions imposed under H0 .
Hence, H0 imposes n2 (p1-p2). Where (n) is the number of variables used in VAR estimate, p1
and p2 are the number of lags used in the estimation of the two VARs. The null hypothesis
under investigation here is that there is no structural change due to the adoption of inflation
targeting in the economy of country j, where j=South Africa, Brazil and Chile).
Hence, after this illustration of the theoretical framework of the approaches used in the
empirical part of this paper it is now appropriate to discuss the steps of the estimation procedure
and the results. I start with discussing the SVARs and estimation results obtained for the three
countries and then I end up with the results of the Likelihood Ratio (LR) statistic estimation.
5.2. Estimation and Results:-
5.2.1 VAR and SVARs Estimates:
The benchmark specification of the unrestricted VARs and Structural VARs consists of
four variables: inflation rate, output gap, the policy variables that are specified by the policy-
maker of the monetary policies in those countries during the pre-inflation targeting as well as
the adoption periods of this regime (e.g. I have used the rate of change in the logarithmic
transformation of monetary aggregates to indicate the policy variable during the pre-adoption
period, whereas, I have utilized the money market rate during the adoption periods in the VARS
and SVAR estimates of the two periods of interest). The fourth variable is the rate of change in
the logarithmic transformation of the nominal exchange rate. Those series have been assembled
on quarterly basis for Brazil, Chile, and South Africa.
The key constraint that I have faced in estimating monetary policy VARs and SVARs in
those three emerging market economies was the existence of non-interpolated quarterly data on
some variables spanning for long enough periods. I have assembled the relevant data for the
three countries over the period (1970:Q1 - 2007:Q4) from different data sources.42
Variables are expressed in logarithmic transformed terms, except the money market rate
and inflation rate. Furthermore, unit root tests have been performed on these time series to
determine whether they have a unit root or not. Table: (A-1) in the appendix shows the order of
integration of the time series used for the three courtiers of interest. The VAR uses a stationary
transformation of the variables 43. All the variables that are integrated of order one enter in first
differences, while the series that are integrated of order two enters in second difference. On the
other hand, stationary series (which are integrated of order zero) enter in levels. Then, I have
tested whether the chosen VAR has satisfactory properties.44
nto quarterly data. (For more detailsI have had to convert the frequency of some annual and monthly data series i42
about the variables used and the data sources, refer to appendix).
43 There is a large debate on whether to include stationary or non-stationary variables in VAR estimation .However,
it is essential for the stationarity of the VAR to perform unit root tests in the time series used in it. Therefore, the
Augmented Dickey Fuller test has been performed and the included series were determined depending on the result
of this test. See, table: (A-1) in the appendix.
44 Therefore, I have checked if the residuals are stationary, normal and not auto-correlated. A visual inspection of the
residuals revealed that there were no major outliers. Multivariate serial correlation of the residuals has been tested to
determine if the residuals were stationary. In this regard, a residual serial correlation Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test
has been used to test the null hypothesis of no serial correlation for the residuals of the estimated VARs.
The main Steps of the estimations are summarized as follows:
· For South Africa, I have estimated a VAR spans from 1970:Q1 to 1999:Q4 indicating
the pre-inflation targeting period. The variables in this VAR are the first difference of
inflation rate d(infl_sa), output gap (outputgap_sa), the rate of change in the
logarithmic transformation of monetary aggregates (m3_sa_rate), and the rate of change
in the logarithmic transformation of the nominal exchange rate (nom_er_sa_rate). I
have used (M3) instead of any other definition of monetary aggregates in this VAR
estimate due to the fact that the South African Reserve Bank adopted the monetary
targeting regime which depended mainly on M3 as a way to perform its monetary policy
before the announcement of the adoption of inflation targeting regime. 45
· Standard lag length selection criteria are usually used to select the number of lags of
the VAR. I have used Schwarz Information Criterion (SC) to coincide between the need
for providing a good specification and the possibility of loosing observations. The
usage of (SC) has showed that the best lag length of the VAR was three lags, which
helped to obtain a stable VAR.
· The impulse response functions have been obtained from the VAR that covers the pre-
inflation targeting period. (See, Figure B-B1 in the appendix).
· Then, another VAR estimated for the period of inflation targeting adoption which
spans from 2000:Q1 to 2007:Q4. Using the variables d(infl_sa), (outputgap_sa),
(nom_er_sa_rate). But, this time instead of monetary aggregate series, I have used the
first difference of the money market rate d(mmr_sa). This indicates that -under inflation
targeting- there is no role for monetary aggregates. Depending on Schwartz information
(SC) criterion, I have utilized lag of three quarters.
· The impulse response functions have been obtained from the VAR that covers the
inflation targeting period. (See, Figures B-B2)
· The above-unrestricted VAR models that cover the pre-inflation targeting period and
the adoption period have represented the essential basis towards obtaining two SVARs
to see differences in the responses to structural shocks because of the inflation targeting
regime.
45 This has been indicated in sub-section 4.3 of this paper that has discussed the monetary policy performance in
South Africa and in table (2).
· In order to estimate the SVAR models, I have to impose some restrictions in terms of
the residuals from the VAR estimates and the stochastic errors (or innovations) in the
structural system.
· The first SVAR for South Africa covers the period from 1970:Q1 to 1999:Q4 (i.e. it
covers the pre-inflation targeting period). These restrictions are short-term; I have tried
to choose them depending on the theory and the features of the periods under
investigation. Those identification restrictions indicate the following:
(i) Inflation rate responds to its innovation, to changes in monetary aggregates and to
changes in nominal exchange rate. The main aim of this restriction is to capture the fact
that monetary aggregates represented the focus of monetary targeting regime adopted in
this period to maintain lower rates of inflation. Furthermore, this restriction indicates that
there is contemporaneous pass-through and shows that exchange rate played the role of a
nominal anchor that characterized the period under investigation. Hence, this restriction
has its counterpart support in the widespread literature that investigated the relation
between inflation, monetary aggregates and exchange rates.
(ii) Output gap is affected by its own innovation and shocks to inflation rates. This
restriction is imposed to show that there is no role played by monetary policy in affecting
output. The main goal of monetary policy is to maintain lower inflation rates with no
objective to achieve any output target. In addition, this restriction indicates that high
inflation also leads to variability in inflation that can be costly for the economy. This also
coincides with the theory that focuses on the relation between inflation and economic
performance, especially, in the short-run.
(iii) Whereas, monetary aggregates respond to its own innovation, the shocks to inflation
rate and to innovation in output gap. This restriction shows that the pre-inflation targeting
period were concentrating on the path of monetary aggregate and it takes into account the
innovation in inflation and technological improvements. Which implies that the policy-
maker when he sets the policy variable takes into consideration the behaviour of other
important macroeconomic variables.
(iv) Finally, exchange rate responds to its innovation and to shocks in inflation rate. This
restriction captures the direct relation between inflationary pressures and the behaviour of
exchange rate that represents the main interest of the literature in the context of emerging
market economies. 46
This means that the direct link that goes from exchange rate to inflation is captured by the
restriction (i), whereas, the relation that goes to the reverse direction is captured by
restriction (iv).
· The estimated Structural VAR has been just identified after only one iteration;
indicating a valid restriction scheme. Another identification schemes have been tried
but they have not been satisfied by the data. Figure (B-B3) shows the generated
impulse response functions. The accumulated response to structural one standard
deviation innovations obtained from the SVAR estimates for the pre-inflation targeting
period is illustrated in table (A-3).
· The Second SVAR spans from 2000:Q1 to 2007:Q4 (i.e. it covers the inflation
targeting period). I have used the same identification as the pre-inflation targeting.
However, the only difference is that instead of using monetary aggregates as the policy
variable; I have used the first difference of money market rate to show the lack of the
importance of monetary aggregates in this period and the emphasis of monetary
authority on short-term interest rates as the instrument of its monetary policy.
· The estimated Structural VAR has been just identified indicating a valid identification
that suits the data. Another identification schemes have been tried but they have not
been satisfied by the data. Table (A-4) shows the generated cumulative impulse
response functions.
· For Brazil, I have done the same analysis. The first estimated VAR covers the pre-
inflation targeting period from 1970:Q1 to 1999:Q2. The variables used in this VAR
were inflation rate (infl_br), output gap (outputgap_br), the rate of change in the
logarithmic transformation of monetary aggregates M1 (m1_br_rate), and the rate of
change in the logarithmic transformation of the nominal exchange rate
(nom_er_br_rate). The lag length due to (SC) criterion has been four lags. Also, this
VAR is stable. The impulse response function from this VAR is illustrated in (Figure:
B-B5 in the appendix).
· Another VAR is estimated for the period of inflation targeting adoption which spans
from 1999:Q3 to 2007:Q4. Using the variables (infl_br), (outputgap_br) and
(nom_er_br_rate). However, this time instead of monetary aggregate series, I have
For instance: Ho and McCauley (2003), and Agénor (2000). However, the main focus of those authors was the46
relation between exchange rate and inflation in the context of inflation targeting regime.
used the money market rate (mmr_br) to indicate the importance of short-term interest
rate in the context of inflation targeting framework.
· The next step was to estimate the Structural VARs. I used the previous mentioned two
VARs (i.e. the one for the pre-inflation targeting and the one for the adoption period)
with the same restrictions imposed in the South African case. The estimated SVARs
have been just identified after one iteration. Also, I have obtained the accumulated
impulse responses of the SVARs estimates for the two periods.
· For Chile, I have done the same steps. I have estimated a VAR spans from 1970:Q1 to
1990:Q3 for the pre-inflation targeting period. The variables used in this VAR were
the first difference of inflation rate d(infl_ch), Output gap (outputgap_ch), the rate of
change in the logarithmic transformation of monetary aggregates M1 (m1_ch_rate), and
the rate of change in the logarithmic transformation of the nominal exchange rate
(nom_er_ch_rate). The lag specification was twelve due to (SC) criterion.
· Another VAR estimated for the period of inflation targeting adoption that goes from
1990:Q4 to 2007:Q4. Using, the variables d(infl_ch), (outputgap_ch). However, this
time instead of monetary aggregate series I used the average interest rate because of the
non-availability of money market rate or any proxy for short-term interest rates for the
period of study and this variable entered in its 2nd difference to guarantee the stability of
the estimated VAR (i.e. d(interst_Chile,2)). In addition, I have used (nom_er_ch_rate).
The lag length was four according to (SC) criterion.
· The further step was to estimate the Structural VARs through imposing the same
scheme considered in the previous cases of South Africa and Brazil. The estimated
Structural VARs were also just identified, indicating a valid identification. In addition,
tables (A-7 and A-8) show the generated accumulated responses obtained from the two
estimated SVARs.
The most remarkable results obtained from the above analysis:
For South Africa, comparing the responses to Cholesky identification obtained from the
estimated VARs for the pre-inflation targeting and the adoption periods shows that an
exogenous increase in the monetary policy variable used during the pre-inflation targeting
period leads to an increase in inflation rate but this response of inflation dies out after the 10th
quarter. Overall, this impact is stronger at this period compared to the response of the inflation
rate to the policy variable during the inflation targeting period (i.e. money market rate) which
appears until the 3rd quarter. Afterwards, there is almost no impact on inflation rates.
There is a considerable response of output gap to shocks in the monetary policy variable- as
indicted by the responses to Cholesky identification obtained from the estimated VARs for the
pre-inflation targeting period- but after 12 quarters, the output gap returns to its initial level,
showing that monetary policy does not affect output in the long-run. However, under inflation
targeting period, the response of output gap to monetary policy variable was zero on average.
On the other hand, the inflation rates responds to shocks in nominal exchange rate but this
response was very sluggish, indicating a very slow pass-through of exchange rates in the pre-
inflation targeting period. However, under inflation targeting, the response of inflation to
shocks in nominal exchange rate is more considerable in the first 5 quarters compared to that of
the monetary policy instrument, indicating that there is a pass-through effect. This is surprising
me, because under inflation targeting the more effective tool to achieve the target is the
monetary policy instrument that should have the considerable impact on inflation rates, but
what I have found here, is a considerable impact of nominal exchange rates on inflation rates.
This shows the need for imposing restrictions and using the SVAR estimation.
Hence, after imposing restrictions and obtaining SVARs, the comparison of the accumulated
responses to structural one standard deviation innovations obtained from the estimates for the
pre-inflation targeting and the adoption periods shows that; up to the 12th quarters the
innovation of a one percentage point in the monetary policy variable induces a total
accumulated change on inflation rate of 1.36 percentage point ( before the adoption of inflation
targeting regime) compared with a negative impact of 0.45 percentage point (after the
announcement of inflation targeting). This indicates that monetary targeting was not effective
under the pre-inflation targeting period. Also, it shows that the move to inflation targeting
regime helped to achieve its price stability objective by adjusting short-term interest rate.
In addition, the innovation of one percentage point in the nominal exchange rate variable
induces a total accumulated change on inflation rate of negative 0.13 percentage point before
the adoption of inflation targeting and it induced a positive impact of 0.04 percentage point
after inflation targeting. This implies that; after the adoption of inflation targeting the pass
through effect is still appearing which coincide with the outcome of graphical inspection of the
responses to Cholesky identification obtained from the estimated VARs. Interestingly, this is a
feature that is common in emerging market economies where in practice still exchange rate
plays a direct impact on inflation rates and it is impossible in inflation targeting framework for
the central bank in those countries to commit itself to only one nominal anchor.
Furthermore, after three years, the one time innovation of one percentage point in the
monetary policy variable (whether monetary aggregates or the money market rate) induces
approximately no impact on output gap in both periods, showing that monetary policy does not
have a considerable affect on output in the long-runs under the two periods.
For Brazil, the responses to Cholesky identification obtained from the estimated VAR for
the pre-inflation targeting period shows that an increase in the monetary policy variable (i.e.
monetary aggregate series) leads to no significant impact -on average- on inflation rate which
indicates that the response of inflation rate to monetary policy shock was not strong in the pre-
inflation targeting period. However, for the inflation targeting period, there is a significant
response of the inflation rate to money market rate- especially in the short to medium terms-
compared to the pre-inflation targeting period.
In addition, there is almost no response of output gap to shocks in monetary policy variable
in the pre-inflation targeting period. However, there is a considerable negative impact after the
adoption of this regime. Furthermore, the inflation rates responds more strongly to shocks in
nominal exchange rate after the change in regime. Under inflation targeting, the response of
inflation rates to shocks in nominal exchange rate has a pattern that is quite similar to that of the
monetary policy instrument, indicating that there is a pass through effect. However, during
inflation targeting, the response of inflation rate to nominal exchange rate is more significant in
the short term compared to the response of inflation rate to money market rates. This leads to
the same surprise that I found in the South African case, (i.e. I have found nominal exchange
rates playing a key role in affecting inflation rates). While, according to theoretical aspects of
inflation targeting regime it should be the case that the monetary instrument, only, has the
considerable impact on inflation rates. This also shows the need for imposing short-term
restrictions using Structural VAR approach.
Hence, after imposing restrictions and obtaining SVARs, the comparison of the accumulated
responses to structural one standard deviation innovations obtained from the estimates for the
pre-inflation targeting and the adoption periods shows that up to the 12th quarters, the
innovation of a one percentage point in the monetary policy variable induces a total
accumulated change on inflation rate of 34.64 percentage point (before the adoption of inflation
targeting regime) compared with a 0.09 percentage point (after the announcement of inflation
targeting).
Moreover, the innovation of one percentage point in the nominal exchange rate variable
induces a total accumulated change on inflation rate of 5.73 percentage points before the
adoption of inflation targeting and it induced a positive impact of 0.61 percentage point after
inflation targeting. This implies that after the adoption of inflation targeting the pass through
effect is still appearing but it has been mitigated by the adoption of inflation targeting regime.
This also copes with the outcome of graphical inspection of the responses to Cholesky
identification obtained from the estimated VARs and indicates that exchange rates plays a role
under inflation targeting regime. Also, up to the 12th quarter, the one time innovation of one
percentage point in the monetary policy variable (whether monetary aggregates or the money
market rate) induces approximately no impact on output gap in both periods, showing that
monetary policy does not have a considerable affect on output in the long-runs under the two
periods.
For Chile, the responses to Cholesky identification obtained from the estimated VARs for
the pre-inflation targeting period and the adoption periods shows that the response of inflation
rate to monetary policy shock was stronger in the pre-inflation targeting period compared to,
almost, no impact in the adoption period. Also, there is a response of output gap to shocks in
monetary policy variable before the implementation of inflation targeting. However, this
response dies out in the long-run, specifically after the 10th quarter, showing that monetary
policy does not affect output in the long-run. In addition, there is no strong response of output
gap to monetary policy shocks under inflation targeting.
On the other hand, the inflation rates do respond to shocks in nominal exchange rate,
indicating a pass-through effect of exchange rate before the change in the regime. Nevertheless,
the response of inflation rate to shocks in nominal exchange is almost zero under inflation
targeting, indicating a pattern that differs from South Africa and Brazil where the pass-through
effect played a key role during the inflation targeting period. This in turn shows the need to
impose some restrictions in order to show whether it is possible to have exchange rate playing a
role as well as the monetary instrument in affecting inflation or not.
Therefore, comparing the accumulated responses to structural one standard deviation
innovations obtained from the SVARs estimated for the pre-inflation targeting and the adoption
periods shows that, after three years, the innovation of a one percentage point in the monetary
policy variable induces a total accumulated change on inflation rate of negative 3.79
percentage point (before the adoption of inflation targeting regime) compared with a 0.99
percentage point (after the announcement of inflation targeting). In addition, the innovation of
one percentage point in the nominal exchange rate variable induces a total accumulated change
on inflation rate of 9.79 percentage points before the adoption of inflation targeting and it
induced a negative impact of 0.99 percentage point after inflation targeting. This implies a
different outcome compared to the South African and Brazilian cases where, the Chilean case
shows the absence of the role of exchange rates in inflationary pressures under the adoption of
inflation targeting regime. This also copes with the outcome of graphical inspection of the
responses to Cholesky identification obtained from the estimated VARs. Also, up to the 12th
quarter, the one time innovation of one percentage point in the monetary policy variable
(whether monetary aggregates or the money market rate) induces approximately no impact on
output gap in both periods, showing that monetary policy does not have a considerable affect on
output in the long-runs under the two periods.
To sum up, the above analysis shows that, in the three countries of interest, pre- inflation
targeting period shows the unsatisfactory results of monetary targeting and pegged exchange
rates as nominal anchors and the importance to move towards the inflation targeting regime. Up
to 12 quarters the cumulative impact of monetary policy shocks on output gap is almost zero,
indicating that inflation targeting did not lead to macroeconomic effect in these countries.
However, the impact of monetary policy shocks on inflation rates is mixed -under inflation
targeting- between a negative impact in South Africa and a no considerable one in the cases of
Brazil and Chile.
On the other hand, using the results obtained from Structural VAR estimation, I have found
a common characteristic under inflation targeting regime - in the South Africa and Brazil (but I
have not found it in Chile) - that is the exchange rate plays a direct impact on inflation rates and
it is impossible for the central bank in those countries to commit itself to only inflation targets
as nominal anchors. This implies the need for further improvements in the exchange markets of
those two countries because those countries- as the case in most of the emerging market
economies- are more vulnerable to external shocks and to exchange rate fluctuations.
Interestingly, the empirical finding in this paper coincides with the general remarks about
emerging market economies which has been mentioned by Ho and McCauley (2003, pp. 2-3) 47
who have showed that, emerging market economies tend to be relatively more vulnerable to the
various consequences of exchange rate fluctuations than are industrial economies. The greater
vulnerability arises from, among other possible factors, patterns of consumption associated with
relatively low incomes and histories of higher inflation. Thus, exchange rate considerations
figure more prominently in policymaking in emerging market economies than in their industrial
economy counterparts, regardless of the specific policy regime. Furthermore, even under a strict
construction of inflation targeting, exchange rate considerations can be expected to play a more
prominent role in emerging market economies, given the greater sensitivity of their domestic
47 The main motive of their paper was examining two main issues. The first was why the exchange rate matters,
especially for emerging market economies. The second was under what circumstances and how countries had dealt
with the challenges posed by the exchange rate in the context of inflation targeting. (For more details, refer to Ho and
McCauley (2003)).
prices to the exchange rate. Hence, exchange rate movements appear to have posed significant
challenges to emerging market inflation targeters.
Therefore, using VARs and SVARs estimates has provided a picture of the response of non-
policy variables to monetary policy shocks. However, I have obtained mixed results which
cannot provide an answer to the following question: “Did the adoption of inflation targeting
regime lead to structural changes in the economies of South Africa, Brazil and Chile?”.
Therefore, as a further step, I use the simple Likelihood Ratio (LR) statistic test to provide an
answer to this important question.
5.2.2 The Log Likelihood Ratio (LR) Statistic:
In order to identify the possible effects of inflation targeting on macroeconomic variables, I
have estimated the (LR) Statistic to test for structural changes due to the adoption of inflation
targeting in those countries. I have used five variables unrestricted VAR. Those variables were
inflation rate (infl), output gap (outputgap), monetary aggregate. Concerning the third variable,
it is known that there are many definitions of monetary aggregates but, I have utilized M3 (i.e.
lm3) in the VAR estimate for South Africa and M1 (i.e. lm1) in the VAR estimates for Brazil and
Chile. The fourth variable is the money market rate (in the case of South Africa and Brazil) and
average interest rates (in the case of Chile) 48. The third and fourth variables have been used to
consider the policy variables specified by the monetary authority.
The fifth variable is the (nominal exchange rate, log) (lnom_er). Those five variables were used
in the estimation of the pre-inflation targeting and the adoption periods of this regime as well as
for the whole sample estimation. I have followed three steps to end up with a (LR) Statistic:
(i) I have estimated VARs, using the above-mentioned five variables and depending mainly
on the data that covers the pre-inflation targeting period (from 1970:Q1 to 1999:Q4 for South
Africa, from 1970:Q1 to 1999:Q2 for Brazil, and from 1970:Q1 to 1990:Q3 for Chile). Then, I
have determined the appropriate lag length of the estimated VARs using the Schwarz Criterion
(SC) and I have followed the same procedure of analysis -mentioned before- in order to check
for the properties of the estimated VARs and the residuals. The appropriate lag length is 3 lags
for both South Africa and Brazil VAR estimates for this period. Whereas, it is 12 lags for Chile
48 Due to the non-availability of money market rate for Chile that spans along the period of interest from 1970:Q1 to
2007:Q4.
estimates and the estimated VARs were stable49. Then; I have obtained the log likelihood for
the pre-inflation targeting period.
(ii) I have estimated VARs with the same mentioned variables but the data cover the adoption
period of inflation targeting (from 2000:Q1 to 2007:Q4 for South Africa, from 1999:Q3 to
2007:Q4 for Brazil, and from 1990:Q4 to 2007Q4 for Chile). The appropriate lag length -using
the Schwarz Information criterion - is 3 lags for South Africa and 4 lags for Brazil VAR
estimates and Chile. Then; I have obtained the log likelihood for the inflation targeting adoption
period.
(iii) The log likelihood of the unrestricted model obtained by summing up log likelihood
obtained form steps (i) and (ii), I have called it (likelihood_ur).
(iv) I estimated VARs with the same mentioned variables but the currently used data covers
the whole period of this study (i.e. from 1970:Q1 to 2007:Q4) for the three countries. The lag
length for the estimated VAR for South Africa and Brazil is 3 lags, whereas, the lag length for
the equivalent VAR for Chile is 5 lags.
Then, I have obtained the log likelihood for the whole period, this represents the log likelihood
of the restricted model, I called it (likelihood_r).
(v) Now, it is the step to compute the log likelihood ratio statistic, which takes in our analysis
the following form:
(LR) Statistic= 2(likelihood_ur - likelihood_r) ~ 2X  (n2 (pur - pr))
Where, (likelihood_ur) and (likelihood_r) are the maximized values of the unrestricted and
restricted models, respectively. The (LR) test statistic has an asymptotic 2X distribution with
degrees of freedom equal to (n2 (pur-pr)) under the null hypothesis of no structural change,
where n is the number of varibles (i.e 5 variables). pur and pr are the number of lags used in the
estimation of the unrestricted and restricted models, respectively. The following table
summarizes the obtained results and the steps followed to obtain the Likelihood Ratio ((LR))
statistic and the tabulated values that should be compared with the computed one to see whether
the null is rejected or not in the three countries.
49 I have already discussed the steps of the analysis that I follow in estimating unrestricted VARs at the beginning of
sub-section 5.2 of this paper. The only difference is that, here, I use 5 variables VAR estimate. While, at the
commencement of the said sub-section I was using 4 variables VAR estimate.
Table(4) : The Computation of the Likelihood Ratio (LR) Statistic Through Using 5
Variables VAR Estimates
South Africa Brazil Chile
(1)Log likelihood for the pre-inflation targeting period 773.0704 -612.2310 867.6685
(2) Log likelihood for the inflation targeting period 364.5939 361.6919 554.2611
(3) Log likelihood for the whole period (likelihood_r) 984.3229 -769.5190 416.3217
(4)Log likelihood of the unrestricted model obtained by
summing up rows (1) and (2) (likelihood_ur) 1137.6643 -250.5391 1421.9296
(5)(LR) Statistic= 2(likelihood_ur - likelihood_r) 306.6828 1037.9598 2011.2158
(6) Degrees of freedom (n2 (pur-pr)) 75 100 275
(7)Tabulated values from statistical tables at 5 percent
significance level *
79.08 79.08 146.57
Note: (*) The tabulated values are obtained from (Pindyck and Rubinfeld ,1998, p. 604).
The above table clearly shows that the (LR) Statistic is greater than the tabulated value. So,
the null hypothesis of no structural changes due to the adoption of inflation targeting is rejected.
This, in turn, indicates that there is a structural change in those countries. This provides
empirical evidence (through using simple statistic) that the adoption of inflation targeting has
an impact on macroeconomic variables in the three countries of interest.
6. Conclusion and Policy Implication:-
This paper investigates the monetary policy performance in Brazil, Chile and South Africa
under inflation targeting framework. It provides an empirical assessment through using the
unrestricted Vector Auto-regression (VAR) and Structural Vector Auto-regression (SVAR)
approaches depending on data spans from the first quarter of 1970 to the fourth quarter of 2007.
Furthermore, it uses a simple Likelihood Ratio (LR) Statistic to test for structural changes due
to the adoption of inflation targeting regime in those countries.
The main results are as follows. In first place, the analysis shows that inflation targeting
does make a difference in the performance of monetary policy in those countries. It indicates an
improvement in main macroeconomic indicators after the adoption of inflation targeting
compared to the pre-adoption period. Secondly, the estimation of the Likelihood Ratio (LR)
statistic shows structural changes in the three economies of interest due to the adoption of
inflation targeting regime. This implies that the implementation of inflation targeting regime is
an appropriate step towards achieving economic stabilization and strengthening the ability of
those economies to overcome external shocks. However, those countries are still affected by
exchange rate fluctuations that are partially mitigated by inflation targeting regime. Therefore,
further steps have to be achieved to protect those economies through developing the foreign
exchange markets and building up their international reserves.
Thirdly, the experience of Brazil, Chile and South Africa provide lessons that can lead to
the enthusiasm of other emerging market economies to adopt such a framework. Those lessons
are:
(1) It is not necessarily the fulfillment of the all perquisites for the adoption of inflation
targeting regime.
(2) It is possible for any emerging market economy that is suffering from high rates of
inflation to imitate the South African experience. This can be through practicing a
transition period from informal to formal inflation targeting. Such a transition period
improves the credibility of the country’s monetary policy and enhances its confidence to
announce the adoption of full-fledged inflation targeting regime as a further step.
(3) The three experiences illustrate the importance of financial developments in order to
guarantee the instrument independence of the central bank in the context of inflation
targeting. This will help in avoiding the inflationary financing of the government deficit.
(4) Exchange rates still play a key role in the context of inflation targeting regime. So, it is
possible for any emerging market economy that is looking for the adoption of inflation
targeting to mitigate the vulnerability of its economy to exchange rate fluctuations
through the adoption of this regime. However, during the first years of the adoption the
announced inflation targets may not be fulfilled because of these fluctuations.
Nevertheless, after enhancing monetary policy credibility under inflation targeting regime
and reforming the exchange rate markets, marvelous outcomes can be achieved through
capturing the pass-through effect of exchange rate on inflation rates as the empirical
results for South Africa and Brazil indicates.
(5) Coordination between monetary and fiscal authorities is important- under inflation
targeting- as it indicates the responsibility of both authorities in providing the suitable
economic environment to achieve the target. This is clear through the open letter that has
to be sent by the governor of the Brazilian Central Bank to the minister of finance if the
target has been breached and it is obvious in the case of South Africa where the minister
of finance does the announcement of the inflation target.
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Appendix (A):
Data Issues and Tables
The data in this paper spans from 1970:Q1 to 2007:Q4.
In all the three countries, the real Gross domestic Product (GDP) series -obtained from the
World Development Indicators edited by the World Bank on annual basis - has been used after
conversion to quarter frequency to obtain the output gap which was estimated by real GDP
minus potential output. On the other hand, inflation rate is measured as a percentage change in
the consumer price index. The rate of change in the logarithmic transformation of monetary
aggregates and of nominal exchange rate has been computed using Eviews. Those series have
been used in VAR and SVAR estimates for the pre-inflation targeting and adoption periods.
However, only the logarithmic transformation of monetary aggregate and of nominal exchange
rate series have been used to estimate the unrestricted and restricted VAR models to compute
the Likelihood Ratio (LR) statistic, which used to check for the possible structural changes due
to the adoption of inflation targeting regime.
For South Africa, the time series are obtained from quarterly data available from the
International Financial Statistics (IFS) edited by the International Monetary Fund. These
variables are: inflation rate, the money market rate, nominal exchange rate, and three
definitions of monetary aggregates (i.e. M1, M2, M3). However, in VAR estimation the most
appropriate definition of monetary aggregate was M3 which has been used. The annual growth
rate has been used from the World Development Indicators (WDI) database available from the
World Bank on annual basis and then transformed into quarterly basis.
For Brazil, the following time series (the money market rate, M1, M2, M3, and nominal
exchange rate) are from quarterly data available from the International Financial Statistics
(IFS). Nevertheless, for the non-availability of a long data series that starts from 1970 for (real
Gross Domestic Product and inflation rate). These two series were obtained from different data
sources. Annual growth rate was obtained from the World Development Indicators (WDI)
database available from the World Bank on annual basis and then transformed into quarterly
basis. While, the inflation rate was obtained from the database available from the Brazilian
Central Bank and available on monthly basis and transformed into quarterly basis. The
transformation of the data frequency has been done through using the econometric package
(Eviews).
For Chile, the following two time series (e.g. inflation rate and nominal exchange rate) are
obtained from quarterly data available from the International Financial Statistics (IFS).
However, the two definitions of monetary aggregates (e.g. M1 and M2) were available also from
the (IFS) but on annual basis. Therefore, they have been transformed to quarterly series. Annual
growth rate is obtained from the World Development Indicators (WDI) database available from
the World Bank on annual basis and then transformed into quarterly basis. Furthermore, I have
had to use the average interest rate series as a proxy of monetary policy instrument due to the
non-availability of a series of money market rate or any proxy for the short-term interest rate
for the period 1970-2007 in (International Financial Statistics (IFS), the World Development
Indicators (WDI), the World Economic Outlook (WEO) and even not available at the database
of Central Bank of Chile (where most of the data series starts from 1986). The average interest
rate series has been obtained from the Global Development Finance database available from the
World Bank. In addition, the transformation of the data frequency has been done through using
the econometric package (Eviews).
Table (A-1): Unit Root Tests for the Main
Economic Variables
South Africa
Variable ADF
Statistic
Order of Integration
Inflation Rate(infl_sa) -10.05232* I(1)
Monetary Aggregate,log (lm1_sa) -12.45971* I(1)
Monetary Aggregate, log (lm2_sa) -10.51292* I(1)
Monetary Aggregate,log (lm3_sa)*** -10.21416* I(1)
Nominal Exchange Rate,log(lnom_er_sa)*** -9.488191* I(1)
Output gap(outputgap_sa) -5.282480* I(0)
Money Market Rate ( mmr_sa) -9.211515* I(1)
Brazil
Variable ADF
Statistic
Order of Integration
Inflation Rate (infl_br) -4.340454* I(0)
Monetary Aggregate,log (lm1_br)*** -3.125327* I(1)
Monetary Aggregate,log (lm2_br) -4.063851* I(1)
Monetary Aggregate,log (lm3_br) -4.088987* I(1)
Nominal Exchange Rate,log(lnom_er_br)*** -3.435955* I(1)
Output gap(outputgap_br) -4.062994* I(0)
Money Market Rate ( mmr_br) -8.778164* I(0)
Chile
Variable ADF
Statistic
Order of Integration
Inflation Rate (infl_ch) -7.758265* I(1)
Monetary Aggregate,log (lm1_ch)*** -4.121458* I(0)
Monetary Aggregate,log (lm2_ch) -4.102640* I(0)
Nominal Exchange Rate,log(lnom_er_ch)*** -3.995914* I(0)
Output gap(outputgap_ch) -4.389924* I(0)
Average interest Rate ( air_ch)** -9.134996* I(2)
Source: calculated using Eviews software.
- Unit root tests have been performed on variables expressed as logs, except the inflation rate, the money
market rate, and the average interest rate.
-The lag length is chosen to minimize the Schwarz information criterion.
(*) Denotes significance at 5% level according to the Augmented Dickey Fuller distribution’s critical
values.
(**) For Chile, I had to use the average interest rate series as a proxy of monetary policy instrument due
to the non-availability of a series of money market rate for such a long period that spans from 1970.
(***) The rate of change in the logarithmic transformation of monetary aggregates and of nominal
exchange rate has been computed and tested for stationarity. As expected in all countries it has been
integrated of order zero. Those series have been used in VAR and SVAR estimates. However, only the
logarithmic transformation of monetary aggregate and of nominal exchange have been used to estimate
the unrestricted and restricted VAR models to compute the likelihood ratio statistic.
Table (A-2): Inflation Targeting Regime in Brazil
Year Regulation Date Target
(%)
Tolerance
Intervals
Upper and
Lower
Limits(%)
Actual
Inflation
(IPCA%)
1999
Resolution 2,615 30/6/1999
8 2 6-10 8.94
2000 6 2 4-8 5.97
2001 4 2 2-6 7.67
2002 Resolution 2,744 28/6/2000 3.5 2 1.5-5.5 12.53
2003* Resolution 2,842
Resolution 2,972
28/6/2001
27/6/2002
3.25
4
2
2.5
1.25-5.25
1.5-6.5 9.30
2004* Resolution 2,972
Resolution 3,108
27/6/2002
25/6/2003
3.75
5.5
2.5
2.5
1.25-6.25
3-8 7.60
2005 Resolution 3,108 25/6/2003 4.5 2.5 2-7 5.69
2006 Resolution 3,210 30/6/2004 4.5 2 2.5-6.5 3.14
2007 Resolution 3,291 23/6/2005 4.5 2 2.5-6.5 4.46
2008 Resolution 3,378 29/6/2006 4.5 2 2.5-6.5 NA
2009 Resolution 3,463 26/6/2007 4.5 2 2.5-6.5 NA
Source: The Brazilian Central Bank. Available at: http://www.bcb.gov.br/pec/metas/InflationTargetingTable.pdf
* The open letter of 21/1/2003 adjusted the targets to 8.5% for 2003 and 5.5% for 2004.
Table (A-3): South Africa: Accumulated Response to Structural One S.D. Innovations Obtained
from the SVAR estimates for the Pre-Inflation Targeting Period
Table (A-4): South Africa: Accumulated Response to Structural One S.D. Innovations Obtained
from the SVAR Estimates for the Inflation Targeting Period
Table (A-5): Brazil: Accumulated Response to Structural One S.D. Innovations Obtained from the
SVAR Estimates for the Pre-Inflation Targeting Period
Table (A-6): Brazil: Accumulated Response to Structural One S.D. Innovations Obtained from the
SVAR Estimates for the Inflation Targeting Period
Table (A-7): Chile: Accumulated Response to Structural One S.D. Innovations Obtained from the
SVAR Estimates for The Pre-Inflation Targeting Period
Table (A-8): Chile: Accumulated Response to Structural One S.D. Innovations Obtained from the
SVAR Estimates for the Inflation Targeting Period
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Appendix (B):
Figures
Figure (B-B1): South Africa: Impulse response From VAR for the Pre-Inflation Targeting Period
Note: The sample spans from 1970:Q1 to 1999:Q4, indicating the pre-inflation targeting period. The variables used in this VAR
were four variables. The first difference of inflation rate (infl_sa), output gap (outputgap_sa), the percentage change of the log
transformation of monetary aggregate (m3_sa_rate), and the percentage change of the log transformation of nominal exchange
rate (nom_er_sa_rate). The lag length was 3 lags depending on Schwarz Information Criterion (SC).
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Figure (B-B2): South Africa: Impulse response From VAR for the Inflation Targeting Period
Note: Sample Spans from 2000:Q1 to 2007:Q4, indicating the period of inflation targeting adoption. Using the variables
d(infl_sa), (outputgap_sa), But, this time instead of monetary aggregate series, I used the first difference of the money market
rate d(mmr_sa) and finally (nom_er_sa_rate). Depending on more conservative Schwartz information (SC) criterion, I have
used lag of three.
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Figure (B-B3): South Africa : Impulse response from SVAR Covers
the Pre-Inflation Targeting Period
Figure (B-B4): South Africa: Impulse Response From SVAR in the Inflation Targeting Period
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Response of D(INFL_SA) to Shock1
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Response of D(INFL_SA) to Shock2
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Response of D(INFL_SA) to Shock3
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Response of D(INFL_SA) to Shock4
-.006
-.004
-.002
.000
.002
.004
.006
.008
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
R esponse of OUTPUTGAP_SA to Shock1
-.006
-.004
-.002
.000
.002
.004
.006
.008
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Response of OUTPUTGAP_SA to Shock2
-.006
-.004
-.002
.000
.002
.004
.006
.008
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Response of OUTPUTGAP_SA to Shock3
-.006
-.004
-.002
.000
.002
.004
.006
.008
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Response of OUTPUTGAP_SA to Shock4
-2
-1
0
1
2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Response of D(MMR_SA) to Shock1
-2
-1
0
1
2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Response of D(MMR_SA) to Shock2
-2
-1
0
1
2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Response of D(MMR_SA) to Shock3
-2
-1
0
1
2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Response of D(MMR_SA) to Shock4
-8
-4
0
4
8
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Response of NOM_ER_SA_RATE to Shock1
-8
-4
0
4
8
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Response of NOM_ER_SA_RATE to Shock2
-8
-4
0
4
8
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Response of NOM_ER_SA_RATE to Shock3
-8
-4
0
4
8
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Response of NOM_ER_SA_RATE to Shock4
Response to Structural One S.D. Innovations± 2 S.E.
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Response of INFL_BR to INFL_BR
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Response of INFL_BR to OUTPUTGAP_BR
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Response of INFL_BR to M1_BR_RATE
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Response of INFL_BR to NOM_ER_BR_RATE
-.010
-.005
.000
.005
.010
.015
.020
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Response of OUTPUTGAP_BR to INFL_BR
-.010
-.005
.000
.005
.010
.015
.020
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Response of OUTPUTGAP_BR to OUTPUTGAP_BR
- .010
- .005
.000
.005
.010
.015
.020
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Response of OUTPUTGAP_BR to M1_BR_RATE
- .010
- .005
.000
.005
.010
.015
.020
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Response of OUTPUTGAP_BR to NOM_ER_BR_RATE
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Response of M1_BR_RATE to INFL_BR
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Response of M1_BR_RATE to OUTPUTGAP_BR
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Response of M1_BR_RATE to M1_BR_RATE
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Response of M1_BR_RATE to NOM_ER_BR_RATE
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Response of NOM_ER_BR_RATE to INFL_BR
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Response of NOM_ER_BR_RATE to OUTPUTGAP_BR
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Response of NOM_ER_BR_RATE to M1_BR_RATE
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Response of NOM_ER_BR_RATE to NOM_ER_BR_RATE
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innov ations ± 2 S.E.
Figure (B-B5): Brazil: Impulse Response From VAR for the Pre-Inflation Targeting Period
Note: This estimated VAR covers the pre-inflation targeting period. The sample spans from 1970:Q1 to 1999:Q2. The variables
used in this VAR were inflation rate (infl_br), output gap (outputgap_br), and the percentage change of the log transformation
of the monetary aggregate M1, (m1_br_rate), and that of the nominal exchange rate (nom_er_br_rate).Depending on Schwarz
Information Criterion (SC), the lag length was 4 lags.
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Figure (B-B6): Brazil: Impulse Response From VAR for the Inflation Targeting Period
Note: The sample spans from 1999:Q3 to 2007:Q4. The VAR is estimated for the period of inflation targeting adoption, using
the variables (infl_br), (outputgap_br) and). However, this time instead of monetary aggregate series, I used the money market
rate (mmr_br) and finally I used nom_er_br_rate. The lag specification was 2 lags depending on the Schwarz Information
Criterion.
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Figure (B-B7): Chile :Variance Decomposition From VAR for the Pre-Inflation Targeting Period
Note: The used sample spans from 1970:Q1 to 1990:Q, the variance decomposition provides information about the relative
importance of each random innovation in affecting the variables in the VAR estimated for the pre-inflation targeting period. It
shows that own series shocks explain most of the error variance (that is the case in infl_ch, outputgap_ch, lm1_ch). However,
most of the error variance in monetary aggregate and exchange rate series is explained by shocks to inflation rate.
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Figure (B-B8): Chile: Impulse Response From VAR for the Pre-Inflation Targeting Period
Note: the used data spans from 1970:Q1 to 1990:Q3, the variables in the VAR estimated for the pre-inflation targeting period
were four variables. The first difference of inflation rates d(infl_ch), output gap ( outputgap_ch), the rate of change of the
logarithmic transformation of the monetary aggregate M1(m1_ch_rate) and that of the nominal exchange rate
(nom_er_ch_rate).The lag specification was 12 using (SC) criterion.
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Figure (B-B9): Chile: Variance Decomposition From VAR for the Inflation Targeting Period
Note: The variance decomposition provides information about the relative importance of each random innovation in affecting
the variables in the VAR estimated for the inflation targeting period that spans from 1990:Q4 to 2007:Q4. It shows that
own series shocks explain most of the error variance (that is the case in all the four series).
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Figure (B-B10): Chile: Impulse Response From VAR for the Inflation Targeting Period
Note: the used data spans from 1990:Q4 to 2007:Q4, the variables in the VAR estimated for the inflation targeting period were
four variables. The first difference of inflation rates d(infl_ch), output gap ( outputgap_ch), the second difference of the average
interest rate in Chile d(interest,chile,2) and that of the nominal exchange rate (nom_er_ch_rate).The lag specification was 12
using (SC) criterion.
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